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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has struggled for over one hundred years
to articulate a workable standard for determining whether a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction, over a defendant without violating
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite a
substantial body of precedent, the Court has been unable to enunciate
a consistent, intelligible test to govern personal jurisdiction. The
Court's pronouncements swing between two bases: the territoriality,
sovereignty, and power concerns established by Pennoyer v. Neff,2 and
the defendant-centered fairness analysis announced in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 As a result of this inconsistency, lower
courts adhere to vastly different jurisdictional principles.
Commentators have become increasingly vocal about the need to
establish a clear, concise jurisdictional test that achieves the ultimate
4
goals of coherence, fairness, and judicial economy.
A recent decision of the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York attempted to define such a jurisdictional standard in the
1. The term "personal jurisdiction" refers to a court's power to exercise control over the
individual litigants before it. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). In
contrast, "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to a court's power to adjudicate a particular type of
case. See Murrell v. Stock Growers'Nat'lBank, 74 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1934).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. See, for example, Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal
Jurisdictionof State Courts: Time for Change, 63 Or. L. Rev. 485, 522 (1984) (claiming that it is
"time to shape a doctrine of state court jurisdiction that focuses on fairness to the defendant
under all circumstances") (footnote omitted); Frederick S. Mandler, Federal Practice and
Procedure: PersonalJuisdictionand Class Action, 1 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. 51, 53 (1986) (noting "a
new trend in personal jurisdiction doctrine in which limitations on state jurisdiction derive from
individual liberty interests and state sovereignty is protected through constitutional constraints
on choice of law").
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context of DES litigation. Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories (In re DES
Cases)5 proposed a two-part test designed to guide courts in their
determination of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in
DES litigation; the court suggested that the Ashley test might function
equally well in other mass tort litigation. The Ashley test and the
principles that underlie it signify a renewed commitment on the part
of courts to seek congruous, effective jurisdictional standards. Ashley
represents a laudable attempt to reconcile the disparate and often
conflicting pronouncements of the Supreme Court in this confused
area.
This Recent Development examines the Ashley litigation and
the jurisdictional standard proposed by the Ashley court against the
background of Supreme Court jurisdiction jurisprudence, particularly
in the context of multiparty, mass tort litigation. Part II introduces
the procedural history of the Ashley litigation and the jurisdictional
standard established by the court. Part III traces the history and
development of diethylstilbestrol (DES) and the resulting litigation.
Part IV surveys the major Supreme Court pronouncements on personal jurisdiction, focusing on the interrelated strands of sovereignty,
fairness, interest, and contacts. Part V then analyzes the Ashley
court's analytical approach to the jurisdictional inquiry in light of
Supreme Court precedent and academic commentary. Finally, Part
VI examines the implications of the Ashley holding both for DES and
other mass tort litigation and for jurisdictional inquiry generally.
II. THE ASHLEY LITIGATION AND THE CREATION OF A NEW JURISDICTIONAL STANDARD

In the Ashley litigation, numerous plaintiffs brought claims in
federal court in the Eastern District of New York based on diversity of
citizenship, alleging injury due to exposure to DES in utero. 6 Approximately one-half of the plaintiffs in Ashley were residents of New
York.1 The named defendants were manufacturers and distributors of
DES, or successors to such companies.
Two defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the
district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them consis-

5.
6.

789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
The plaintiffs' Kilegations included claims based on negligence, strict liability, and

warranty. Id. at 559.
7. Id. The Ashley court limited the effectiveness of its pronouncements to residents of New
York. Id. at 559-60.
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tent with the requirements of due process.3 The defendants' motions
presented the court with a dilemma. New York had taken a special
- interest in DES litigation and had developed a policy of providing
compensation to DES victims.9 Yet the court found that traditional
formulations for establishing personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants were inadequate to address the concerns raised in the
Ashley litigation. The Ashley court concluded that the mass tort setting of the litigation required a re-examination of the fundamental
principles of personal jurisdiction analysis. 10 In response to the need
for a revised jurisdictional standard for mass tort litigation, the Ashley
court developed a two-part analysis. The court relied on Supreme
Court precedent but focused on the fairness and interest elements
present in Supreme Court jurisdiction jurisprudence. The test as
articulated by the Ashley court incorporates both an interest and a
burden inquiry:
I. The court must first determine if the forum state has an appreciable
interest in the litigation, i.e., whether the litigation raises issues whose resolution would be affected by, or have a probable impact on the vindication of,
policies expressed in the substantive, procedural or remedial laws of the
forum. If there is an appreciable state interest, the assertion of jurisdiction is
prima facie constitutional.
II. Once a prima facie case is made, the assertion of jurisdiction will be
considered constitutional unless, given the actual circumstances of the case,
the defendant is unable to mount a defense in the forum state without suffering relatively substantial hardship.
Evidence to be considered in determining the defendant's relative hardship includes, inter alia, (1) the defendant's available assets; (2) whether the
defendant has or is engaged in substantial interstate commerce; (3) whether
the defendant is being represented by an indemnitor or is sharing the cost of
the defense with an indemnitor or co-defendant; (4) the comparative hardship
defendant will incur in defending the suit in another forum; and (5) the comparative hardship to the plaintiff if the case were dismissed or transferred for
lack of jurisdiction."

8. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(Boehringer) was responsible for Stayner Corporation (Stayner), a manufacturer of DES,
although Boehringer itself never produced or sold DES. Stayner obtained DES from chemical
companies across the nation and manufactured its DES pills in California. Stayner 'never was
licensed to do business in New York, never maintained an office or agent in New York, never solicited business in New York." Id. at 559. Boehringer, in contrast, was licensed to do business in
New York and sold its products, which did not include DES, throughout the nation. Boehringer
and Stayner merged in 1979. Id.
Boyle & Co. (Boyle) is a closely held California corporation that claimed to have manufactured
and sold DES only in states west of the Mississippi River. Boyle asserted that it never marketed
or sold DES in New York, was never licensed to do business in New York, never maintained an
office or agent in New York, and never advertised in New York. Id.
9. See notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
10. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 577.
11. Id.at587.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DES AND THE MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS
ESTABLISHED BY SINDELL V. ABBOTI'LABORATORIES

A. The History of DES
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first approved DES,
a synthetic estrogen, for use in the United States in 1941.12
Researchers believed the drug was effective in treating the symptoms
of menopause, vaginitis, and certain cancers. 13 The approved uses of
the drug, however, initially did not include the prevention of
14
miscarriage.
In 1947 and 1948, numerous manufacturers sought FDA approval for the use of DES to aid in the prevention of miscarriage and
fetal death. 5 Research had revealed that low levels of estrogen often
accompanied miscarriage. In theory, therefore, a synthetic estrogen
could alleviate the risk of miscarriage. 0 By 1952, the FDA considered
DES safe for use in the prevention of miscarriage. 7 Manufacturers,

encouraged by the drug's widespread acceptance, engaged in
nationwide advertising and marketing campaigns. 8
During the 1950s and 1960s, the drug was widely accepted as
an effective means of preventing miscarriage. Millions of women
ingested DES. 9 DES was sold nationally as a generic drug, produced
by all manufacturers according to an identical formula,2o and market12. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 183 (1982).
13. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 183; Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558. Physicians use DES today to
treat some of these non-pregnancy-related ailments. Bichler,436 N.E.2d at 184.
14. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558; Bichier, 436 N.E.2d at 183-84.
15. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558. See also Arthur H. Downey and Kenneth G. Gulley, Theories ofRecovery for DES Damage, 4 J. Legal Med. 167, 170 (1983).
16. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558.
17. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 184. In 1952, the FDA eliminated the requirement that
manufacturers continue to submit new drug applications and declared DES to be recognized
generally as safe. Id.
18. Authorities estimate the number of DES manufacturers at approximately 200, although
some estimates range as high as 300. Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 171-72, 180 n.63
(cited in note 15). DES never was patented in the United States. Rather, manufacturers followed
a standard formula. Because manufacturers often marketed DES under a generic rather than a
brand name, and because all DES prescriptions shared an identical chemical composition,
pharmacists frequently filled DES prescriptions with whichever manufacturer's product was
available. See Note, Market ShareLiability: An Answer to the DES CausationProblem, 94 Harv.
L. Rev. 668, 670 (1981).
19. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal.3d 558, 607 P.2d 924, 927 (1980) (estimating 1.5 to 3
million women took DES) (citing Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability,
46 Fordham L. Rev. 963,'964-67 (1978)). See also Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 668 (cited in note 18).
20. The FDA requested that all DES manufacturers agree on a single, standard chemical
formula for DES to lessen the administrative burden imposed on the agency by numerous new
drug applications. See Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 169 (cited in note 15).
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ed nationally by a standard description. 21 Even local manufacturers
that targeted small regional markets relied heavily on national
marketing programs and public consensus regarding the drug's efficacy. 22 Because all manufacturers adhered to a standard formula,
DES prescriptions were filled interchangeably with drugs produced by
various manufacturers.23 Although numerous companies produced
and sold DES between 1949 and 1971, several DES manufacturers no
longer exist.
By 1971, however, medical research had revealed that DES
was responsible for the presence of a rare form of vaginal cancer, clear
cell adenocarcinoma, in the daughters of several women who had
ingested DES while pregnant.2 4 Shortly thereafter, the FDA withdrew
25
approval for the marketing of DES for use by pregnant women.
B. DES Litigationand the Market Share Theory
DES litigation began io emerge during the 1970s.2 6 Litigants
filed a large number of DES lawsuits in New York. 27 However,
plaintiffs in DES litigation faced an enormous burden: because of
21.
See, for example, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072
(1989) (estimating 300 manufacturers of DES).
22. Ashley's discussion of the need for a revised jurisdictional standard reflects the
significance of the industry practice of nationwide marketing: "[Tihe technology, marketing,
sociology, and possible ill effects of DES knew no state boundaries. The national nature of the
resulting toxic tort litigation must be reflected in the law's treatment of jurisdictional issues."
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558.
23. Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 170 (cited in note 15). See also Note, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. at 670 (cited in note 18).
24. Vaginal adenocarcinoma was, until this time, a rare disease. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 184.
Medical evidence also indicates that DES is responsible for several other disorders in daughters of
DES patients, including miscarriage, ectopic pregnancy, and uterine cancer. In addition, DES
may cause problems such as undescended testicles, genital deformities, and sterility in male
offspring exposed to the drug. Children exposed in utero to DES may continue to reveal medical
problems linked to the drug as they age. Further evidence suggests that daughters of DES
patients may pass on similar defects to their own female children. The long.term effects,
including permanent, inheritable genetic defects, are uncertain. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558. See
also Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 669 n.8 and authorities cited therein (cited in note 18).
25. However, some evidence exists that doctors continued to prescribe DES to pregnant
women throughout the 1970s. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 558. For a detailed history of the development and marketing of DES in the United States, see Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 16872 (cited in note 15).
26. One source estimated that by 1981, litigants had brought approximately 1000 lawsuits
against DES manufacturers. Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 669 (cited in note 18).
27. "In New York state alone, more than 500 DES cases against scores of defendants are
pending in state and federal courts." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 559. An earlier case noted that "[i]n
New York State alone it has been estimated that more than 100,000 women were injured by
exposure to DES in uteio." Matter of DES Market Share Litigation, 79 N.Y.2d 299, 591 N.E.2d
226, 227 (1992). In 1992, state and federal courts in New York appointed a special master-referee
to coordinate settlement negotiations in pending DES litigation. In re New York County DES
Litigation, 142 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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marketing techniques, the passage of time, and the period during
which the effects of DES remained latent,28 plaintiffs frequently were
unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the drug their mothers
had ingested. 29 Although several courts dismissed DES actions
because plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the specific causation
requirement,30 other courts attempted to manipulate existing tort
liability doctrines in order to grant DES daughters relief.31
The California Supreme Court went one step further in Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories32 when it modified the alternative liability
theory established in Summers v. Tice to conform to the DES
situation. The Summers theory was based on a case in which all
defendants who possibly could have caused a plaintiffs injury were
before the court. Because DES plaintiffs generally were unable to
bring all DES manufacturers before the court,3 4 however, the Sindell

28. Adenocarcinoma appears after a minimum latency period of 10 to 12 years. Sindell, 607
P.2d at 925. This latency period meant that pharmacy and medical records concerning DES
prescriptions frequently had been lost or destroyed and that memories had faded by the time
litigation commenced. See Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 172 (cited in note 15).
29. Although DES plaintiffs can prove both that DES caused their injuries and that certain
defendants manufactured DES for pregnancy-related uses, they are frequently unable to establish
which company manufactured the drug ingested by their mothers. See generally Note, 94 Harv.
L. Rev. 668 (cited in note 18). A plaintiff who is able to identify the exact manufacturer of the
drug that caused her injuries typically may proceed under traditional tort liability principles.
Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1073.
30. See, for example, Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Note, 94
Harv. L. Rev. at 670 n.17 (cited in note 18).
Courts have relied on various theories to enable plaintiffs to overcome pleading
31.
barriers. For example, New York courts initially adopted the concert of action theory to aid
plaintiffs in overcoming the causation barrier. Bichler, 436 N.E.2d at 182. In contrast, several
courts have accepted the alternative liability theory initiated in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,
199 P.2d 1 (1948) (en banc), as a basis for liability of DES manufacturers. See Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979); Ferrignov. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420
A.2d 1305 (1980). For a discussion of the alternative liability theory, see notes 33, 35, 39, and
accompanying text. Plaintiffs alternatively have alleged manufacturer liability under enterprise
liability and conspiracy theories. For a thorough discussion of the various tort liability theories
and their shortcomings in the DES context, see Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 173-90
(cited in note 15). See also Sindell, 607 P.2d 924 (rejecting alternative liability, enterprise
liability, and concert of action theories as inappropriate in the DES context).
32. 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
33. 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, two hunters negligently fired toward the plaintiff, who
was unable to establish which defendant actually injured him. The Summers court held that
when two or more defendants, acting independently, have breached a duty of care toward the
plaintiff, but only one defendant actually caused the plaintiffs injury, the court will hold the
defendants jointly liable unless each defendant is able to prove that he did not cause the injury.
Id. at 3-5.
34. Numerous DES manufacturers entered and exited the DES market between 1947 and
1971; many are no longer in existence. See Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 18).
Further, plaintiffs woula be hard-pressed to find a forum able to obtain jurisdiction over all
existing manufacturers. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936. In Sindell, only five of approximately 200 DES
manufacturers were before the court. The possibility that any one defendant actually manufactured the drug that caused the plaintiffs injuries was so slight that the court concluded it would
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court felt that unmodified alternative liability was not suitable for
DES litigation3 5
Sindell modified the Summers doctrine to create a theory of
liability based on market share: plaintiffs must join manufacturers
that represent a "substantial share" of the relevant market and
submit a prima facie case to support their allegations3a The burden of
proof then shifts to the defendants.
Each defendant must
demonstrate that it could not have produced the drug that injured the
plaintiff; a defendant unable to offer such proof is liable for that
portion of the judgment representing its market share.37 Sindell
rested on the rationale that negligent defendants, rather than
innocent plaintiffs, should bear the costs of injuries because
defendants are in a better position to bear costs that are caused by
defective products. 8
The court concluded that a market-share
approach most closely approximated an equitable distribution of
liability39 The Sindell theory greatly improved the judicial system's
capacity to manage complex DES litigation, yet courts continued to
face difficulties unique to mass tort litigation, including their frequent
inability to obtain jurisdiction over all potential defendants.
IV. JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE: THE TRADITIONAL
FORMULATIONS

For well over one hundred years, both federal and state courts
have struggled to establish a coherent formulation of the due process
requirements for personal jurisdiction. Although the jurisdictional
inquiry has responded to social and technological change, courts have
yet to articulate a clear and intelligible formulation with which to
be unfair to shift the burden of proof to the defendants in accordance with the Summers rationale.
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931.
35. Further, alternative liability is based on cases of simultaneous conduct by all defendants. Conduct of DES defendants, in contrast, spans several decades. In addition, alternative
liability requires joint liability of defendants; the theory offers no means by which to apportion
liability among defendants based on the amount of DES manufactured by each defendant. Note,
94 Harv. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 18).
36. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 936.
39. The Sindell court reasoned that "[u]nder this approach, each manufacturer's liability
would approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products." Id. at 937. One
commentator defended the market-share theory as "structurally sound and basically fair to all
parties." Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 677 (cited in note 18). See also David A. Fischer, Products
Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1623, 1626 (1981) (stating that
"ifthe court apportioned damages according to each defendant's market share, then theoretically
each defendant would be held liable only for approximately as much harm as it caused*).
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analyze whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
conforms to the requirements of the Due Process Clause.4 Aware of
the imprecision and disarray that continue to dominate jurisdictional
due process law, Ashley attempted to clarify the course of the
constitutional inquiry and-posed a test for personal jurisdiction in
mass tort litigation that complies with the fundamental dictates of
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the requirements of due process. A
brief examination of the seminal jurisdiction cases, focusing on the
fairness, interest, and contacts elements, will clarify the Ashley court's
4
approach. 1
A. The FoundationalCases: Pennoyer and International Shoe
In 1877 the Supreme Court articulated a bright-line standard
for personal jurisdiction founded solely on state sovereignty interests
as defined by state territorial boundaries. Pennoyer v. NeffU established that a state could not exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant unless the defendant was served with process while
physically present within the forum. In Pennoyer,the Supreme Court
held a default judgment against a nonresident defendant invalid
because the state court could not assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant not present in the state.43 Pennoyer sanctioned the rule
that a state could not extend its jurisdiction beyond its territorial
boundaries; the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction must be
premised on a defendant's territorial nexus with the forum.44
40.

Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 577.

41.

Because the history of jurisdiction jurisprudence is well documented elsewhere, this

Recent Development focuses only on those elements that are relevant to the Ashley formulation.

42.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).

43.
"[N]o tribunal... can extend its process beyond [the State's] territory so as to subject
either persons or property to its decisions." Id. at 722. The Court did indicate, however, that a
state could require nonresident corporations and associations to consent to jurisdiction as a
condition of transacting business within the forum. This consent would validate a court's exercise
of jurisdiction over the nonresident as long as the nonresident actually received notice of the legal
proceedings at issue. Id. at 735.
44. The Pennoyer Court based its territorial conception of jurisdiction on two principles of

public law derived from Justice Story's writings on international conflicts of laws: first, 'every
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory," and second, 'no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory." Id. at 722. See also Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism,

and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1116 (1981).
However, as Ashley pointed out, until Pennoyer, a state's ability to render an effective judgment

within that state was viewed as a purely domestic exercise of power and did not pose any threat
to interstate "comity." Whether other states would give full faith and credit to the forum state's
judgment was treated ai a separate question. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 578. Pennoyer combined

the two concerns to find that the judgment of a state court without jurisdiction over a defendant
was ineffective within the rendering state as well. Id. The Ashley court found the arguments in
support of Pennoyees "comity" rationale unpersuasive. Id. at 578-79.
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In 194545 the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington48 appeared to replace the Pennoyer power-and-presence
framework with a jurisdictional analysis founded not on notions of
territorialism and sovereignty but on notions of fairness to the defendant.47 InternationalShoe upheld a Washington court's assertion of
jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation that did business in the state
for the purpose of assessing a state unemployment compensation tax
against the defendant. Although the corporation was neither incorporated nor registered to do business in the forum, the Court found
that the defendant had demonstrated a sufficient level of activity
within the forum such that the Washington court's exercise of
jurisdiction would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." 48
Although the Court appeared to abandon the Pennoyer
sovereignty inquiry in favor of a fairness analysis, the Court's
formulation inevitably relied on notions of "presence" within the
forum. By virtue of conducting a "systematic and continuous"4 level
of business activities within the forum, the Court found the defendant
had rendered itself amenable to the forum's jurisdiction. That is, the
Court found the defendant, through its activities within the forum, to
be "present" within the forum. °
The International Shoe minimum contacts test, which established the baseline for personal jurisdiction inquiry throughout the
twentieth century, was fundamentally little more than a flexible conception of Pennoyer's "presence" inquiry. 5' The exercise of jurisdiction
45. In the interim between Pennoyer and InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court began to
move cautiously away from an approach to jurisdiction based strictly on power and presence by
entertaining "fictions" such as implied consent as a basis for jurisdiction when the defendant was
not physically served with process under the Pennoyer model. See, for example, Hess v. Pawlowki,
274 U.S. 352 (1927) (holding that a nonresident motorist 'consents" to the forum state's
jurisdiction when using the forum's highways); see also Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 580-81 (discussing
the fictions of "implied consent," "corporate presence," and "doing business" as bases for
jurisdiction).
46. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
47. The now-famous InternationalShoe test stated that "due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory

of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

48.

InternationalShoe, 326 U.S at 316. The Court concluded that the defendant had

carried on "systematic and continuous" activities in the forum state throughout the years in

question. Id. at 320.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 316-17.
51. Ashley noted that both components of personal jurisdiction inquiry under International
Shoe-sovereignty and fairness-employed a territorial nexus, contacts.based requirement
adopted from Pennoyer. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 579. International Shoe separated the
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comported with due process only if the defendant exhibited certain
contacts within the forum. Although the Court purported to evaluate
the assertion of jurisdiction according to principles of fairness to the
defendant, in reality, InternationalShoe retained significant elements
of Pennoyer's power-based framework.52 Supreme Court decisions
following International Shoe3 vacillated between Pennoyer's powerand-territorialism concepts and International Shoe's concern with
fairness to defendants.
B. The Importance of FairnessUnder the Due Process Clause
A significant body of jurisprudence following InternationalShoe
has continued to emphasize the centrality of a fairness inquiry.
McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Company4 adopted a fairnesscentered approach in its jurisdiction analysis. In McGee, a California
court assumed jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company based on
a California statute that conferred jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who had insurance contracts with California residents. 55 The
McGee court found the insurance contract itself a sufficient "contact"
to support the assertion of jurisdiction. Much of the Court's analysis,
however, focused on the forum state's overriding interest in providing
a forum to its residents for redress when insurers refused to pay their
claims.5 The Court recognized that although acknowledgment of the
forum's interest may cause some inconvenience to the defendant company, this inconvenience certainly did not amount to a denial of due
"sovereignty" analysis into two components: an interest inquiry, in which the forum state may
exert jurisdiction to vindicate its interest in acts having consequences within the forum, and a
presence inquiry, which limits this authority to exercise jurisdiction to instances in which the
defendant's acts occurred within the forum. Id. at 583. Ashley pointed out the flaws in this
conception, stating that "[t]he Court does not explain why the state's ability to impose these
obligations [to defend within the forum] stops at its borders when many out-of-state acts
undoubtedly have consequences sufficient to give the state an interest, if one be needed, to
support imposition of such obligations.* Id.
52. The International Shoe Court stated, "[W]hether due process is satisfied must depend..
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 319.
53. In 1977 the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), declared that
henceforth "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Id. at 212. The Court's proclamation stemmed
from its attempt to clarify the appropriate jurisdictional test for in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
54. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
55. Id. at 221.
56. Id. at 223.
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process,57 because the California forum was a fair one and the
defendant would suffer little inconvenience in being called to defend
there. The California court's assumption of jurisdiction in McGee
satisfied due process despite the arguable absence of significant
contacts between the defendant and the forum. The Court attributed
its generous jurisdictional standard to the impact of technological and
social changes upon the jurisdiction inquiry.8
Insurance Corporationof Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de

Guinee (CBG)5 9 underscored the importance of a fairness inquiry in
evaluating the constitutionality of a forum's assertion of personal

jurisdiction. The CBG Court noted that despite initial pronouncements that the jurisdictional inquiry served to limit state power,
jurisdiction ultimately was a function of the individual liberty interest
that was preserved by the Due Process Clause rather than a function
of federalism concerns. 60 Significantly, the Court noted that the Due
Process Clause, as the source of constitutional limitations on personal
jurisdiction,61 spoke not to state sovereignty but to individual rights.62
57. Id. at 224.
58. McGee recognized that
a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the
full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great
increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time
modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 222-23.
59. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). In CBG, the Court upheld a sanction imposed on the defendant
under F.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(A) for failure to comply with a discovery order; the sanction determined as
a matter of law the existence of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Id. at 70607. The Court permitted the assertion ofjurisdiction based on a Rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanction despite
the record's failure to demonstrate defendant-forum contacts otherwise sufficient to uphold
jurisdiction. Id. at 709.
60. Id. at 702-03 n.10. Commentators rejoiced that CBG had sounded the death knell for
sovereignty inquiry in jurisdictional analysis and had recognized the singular importance of
fairness to the litigants. See, for example, John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction,68 Iowa L. Rev. 1015 (1983). This celebration was premature. Only three years
after the CBG decision, the Court reinstated the minimum contacts test as the fundamental
jurisdictional standard. See BurgerKing Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). See also
notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
61.
See notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
62. The Court forcefully stated that the Due Process Clause "represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." CBG, 456
U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted). CBG recognized that personal jurisdiction logically could not be
considered an instrument of interstate sovereignty, because a defendant can waive the jurisdiction requirement by submitting to the forum's jurisdiction. The Court recognized that if federalism concepts presented in independent restriction on state court jurisdiction, individual litigants
would be unable to waive the jurisdiction requirement, because individual actions are not capable
of changing sovereign powers. Id. at 703 n.10. See also Daan Braveman, Interstate Federalism
and Personal Jurisdiction,33 Syracuse L. Rev. 533, 554 (1982) (declaring that claiming that a
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts63 clarified the centrality of the
burden inquiry in personal jurisdiction analysis. Shutts involved a
class action brought by royalty owners against the defendant, a producer and purchaser of natural gas, for recovery of interest payments.
The company alleged that certification of the plaintiffs' class was
improper, because class members had been provided notice and an
opportunity to opt out but had not been required affirmatively to "opt
in." Therefore, the defendant alleged that the forum state could
exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state class members only if6 those
4
members possessed sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.
The Shutts Court rejected the defendant's assertions, noting
that the minimum contacts requirement existed to protect defendants
from having to defend in distant forums, unless their contacts with
the forum made it fair to require them to defend there.6 5 The
protections afforded defendants by personal jurisdiction are not
necessary, however, to protect the interests of plaintiffs, particularly
members of a plaintiff class in a class action who face none of the
burdens or potential liabilities encountered by out-of-state defendants. 6 Significantly, the Court attributed the parties' differing needs
for the protections afforded by the jurisdiction requirement to the
degree of burden placed on each party by litigation in the forum
state. 7

forum state's exercise of judicial authority threatens the sovereign interests of another state and
then allowing an individual to waive the interests of that state simply by consenting to the
forum's jurisdiction is illogical); Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1018-19 (cited in note 60).
63. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
64. Id. at 806.
65. Id. at 807. The Court noted numerous substantial burdens defendants face when called
to litigate in a distant forum, such as the costs of travel, the necessity of retaining counsel in the
forum state, the possibility of liability for damages, and court costs and attorney's fees. Id. at 808.
66. Id. at 808-09. Furthermore, procedural requirements for certification of a class,
including adequacy of representation and commonality of interest, protect plaintiffs in class action
suits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
67. Shutta, 472 U.S. at 811. For an excellent analysis of the impact of Shutts on personal
jurisdiction theory, see Mandler, 1 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. at 64-74 (cited in note 4). Mandler
concludes that
[t]he Shutt, opinion represents a significant change in personal jurisdiction doctrine. It
clearly indicates that the only purpose of personal jurisdiction analysis is to protect a defendant from being unfairly haled into a distant forum. Thus, it seems to reject the basis
of personal jurisdiction doctrine set forth in every case from Pennoyer to
Volkswagen-protecting interstate federalism or state sovereignty. This does not mean
that Pennoyer is d~ad; the sovereignty concerns of Pennoyer may be reappearing in
choice-of-law doctrine. However, it does seem that, after Shutts, personal jurisdiction
analysis is less encumbered by territorial notions of state sovereignty.
Id. at 70-71 (footnotes omitted).
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C. The Continued Influence of InterstateFederalism
In contrast to cases such as Shutts and CBG, a distinct, significant body of jurisdiction jurisprudence continues to emphasize the
territorialism and contacts concerns first announced in Pennoyer and
8
noted that developments in
InternationalShoe. Hanson v. DencklaP
communication and transportation have continued to ease the
burdens of defending in an out-of-state forum;69 nonetheless, the
Hanson Court refused to depart entirely from the rigid formulations
established in Pennoyer.70 The Hanson Court indicated that state
territorial boundaries are of paramount importance in personal
jurisdiction analysis. The cases that followed Hanson continued to
fortify the role of interstate federalism in personal jurisdiction analysis.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,7 1 the Court applied the minimum contacts test to a stream-of-commerce case in
which the defendants, a retailer and a distributor of automobiles,
challenged the assertion of jurisdiction by an Oklahoma court.7 2 The
defendants claimed to have had no contacts with the forum sufficient
to support an assertion of in personam jurisdiction. 73 The World-Wide
Court agreed, re-emphasizing the importance of territoriality and

68. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
69. Id. at 250-51.
70. The Court argued that restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction do more than
guarantee immunity from litigation in an inconvenient forum; they result from territorial
limitations on the power of the states. Id. at 251. The Court, however, later downplayed the
significance of this statement in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1977) (declaring that
the Hanson Court's statement that restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction result from
territorial limitations on states' power simply clarifies the fact that states are defined by their
geographical boundaries) (citations omitted). Once again the Court waivered in its commitment
to the role of state sovereignty in jurisdictional analysis.
71. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). One commentator described World-Wide Volkswagen as the
jurisdiction case that "has had the most inhibiting effect to date on the exercise of state court
jurisdiction." Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 499 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 4). See also
Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1040-41 (cited in note 60) (claiming that World-Wide "gave the
federalism branch [of jurisdiction analysis] greater prominence than any Supreme Court opinion
since Pennoyer").
72. The plaintiffs purchased an Audi automobile from a retailer in Massena, New York, in
1976. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. One year later, while the plaintiffs were
traveling through Oklahoma en route to Arizona, another car struck the vehicle in the rear,
causing a fire that severely burned several passengers. Id. The purchasers instituted a products
liability action against the manufacturer, importer, regional distributor, and retailer of the
automobile. Id. Both the retail dealer and the distributor challenged Oklahoma's assertion of
jurisdiction. Id.
73. The Court found that the defendants conducted no sales activities in the forum state,
performed no services there, neither advertised nor solicited business there, and took no action to
avail themselves of the benefits and privileges of Oklahoma law. Id. at 295.
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World-Wide
sovereignty in questions of personal jurisdiction.7 4
7
5
Volkswagen implied that interstate federalism could prohibit the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, even if haling
the defendant into the forum caused no inconvenience to the
defendant, the forum had a significant interest in the resolution of the
controversy, and the forum provided the most convenient location for
the litigation.76 Thus, World-Wide Volkswagen established federalism
as the ultimate criterion for testing the constitutionality of
jurisdiction.

7

Further, the World-Wide Court announced a particularly
narrow interpretation of minimum contacts to be applied in stream-ofcommerce cases. The Court asserted that although foreseeability
alone never has been sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause, it is not completely irrelevant.
The
foreseeability with which the Court was concerned, however, was not
the mere likelihood that a product will make its way into a particular
state. Rather, the Court was concerned that the defendant should be

reasonably able to foresee being haled into the forum state based on
her conduct and connections with that state. Jurisdiction premised on
a corporation's placement of products into the stream of commerce,
with the expectation that consumers in the forum state will use the
products, satisfies due process. However, mere "unilateral activity" on

74. The Court claimed that it never had accepted the theory that state lines are irrelevant
in jurisdictional analysis, stating that it could not do so while remaining faithful to constitutional
principles of interstate federalism. Id. at 293. The Court underscored the importance of
territorial concerns in jurisdictional analysis through its insistence on minimum contacts as the
standard for establishing jurisdiction. According to the Court, the contacts test serves two
purposes: First, it protects the defendant from the inconvenience associated with litigation in a
foreign forum, and second, it assures that sister states will not infringe on one another's
sovereignty by assuming jurisdiction "beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system." Id. at 292.
75.
The Court made no historical, textual, or policy reference to support its finding of a
system of interstate federalism implicit in the Constitution. See Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at
1130-32 & n.137 (cited in note 44) (denying that concepts of interstate federalism can be found
implicit in the Constitution). See also note 222 and accompanying text.
76.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294. Critics decried World-Wide's apparent
expansion of the role of sovereignty considerations in personal jurisdiction analysis. See, for
example, Braveman, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 533 (cited in note 62). The decision in CBG, 456 U.S.
694 (1982), which focuses on the centrality of individual liberty interests to the jurisdictional
inquiry, inspired hope in many scholars that the Court was at last departing from its rigid
territorialism-based formulation. Any such hopes were dashed, however, by BurgerKing Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), which claimed that the minimum contacts test remained the
central inquiry in personal jurisdiction analysis. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text; note 60.
77. The Court claimed that the Due Process Clause, as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may divest v state of its power to render a valid judgment. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson,357 U.S. at 251, 254). Both Hanson and World-Wide indicate that
the burden or fairness inquiry is secondary to concerns of interstate federalism in the jurisdictional analysis.

204

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[47:189

the part of those who claim some relationship with the defendant will
not provide a sufficient contact to sustain the forum's exercise of
jurisdiction.78 The "unilateral activity" and purposeful availment
standards created a particularly exacting test for jurisdiction over
manufacturers and distributors whose goods reach regional or
national markets beyond their place of business.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz7 9 upheld Florida's exercise of
jurisdiction over a Michigan defendant sued by a franchisor located in
Miami. The Court in Burger King noted CBG's observation that the
proper focus of the jurisdictional inquiry is the individual liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause80 The Burger King
Court recognized that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant who "purposefully directs" activities toward the forum or
one who "purposefully derives benefit" from interstate activities. The
forum state in these cases has a "manifest interest" in providing a
convenient forum for its residents to redress injuries inflicted by
nonresident defendants.81
Despite elaboration on the liberty interests implicated by the
Due Process Clause, however, the Burger King Court ultimately
returned to the territorial prong of the International Shoe test.
Despite consideration of liberty interests, the Court stated that the
constitutional standard remains whether the defendant purposefully
created minimum contacts with the forum state. 2 The Court rejected
mere "foreseeability of causing injury in another state" as a sufficient
contact upon which to base the assertion of personal jurisdiction;
rather, the appropriate test remained that established by World-Wide
Volkswagen-foreseeability that a defendant's conduct in relation to
the forum was such that the defendant reasonably could anticipate
being haled into court there.m The Court in Burger King reaffirmed
the purposeful availment test established by World-Wide
Volkswagen," explaining that this test protects defendants against
jurisdiction based only on random or attenuated contacts with the
forum.

5

78. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295,297-98 (quoting Hanson,357 U.S. at 253). See
Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 501 (cited in note 4) (maintaining that World-Wide's "foreseeability'

analysis has restricted the exercise ofjurisdiction in lower courts).
79. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
80. Id. at 472 n.13. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
81. BurgerKing, 471 U.S at 473 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 474.
83. Id.
84. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
85. BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 475. Further, BurgerKing clarified the two-pronged nature of
the Supreme Court's jurisdictional test. The jurisdictional analysis begins by inquiring whether
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The 1987 decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
CourtM marked the first occasion upon which the Court actually
applied the multi-factor balancing test to which it alluded in WorldWide Volkswagen and Burger King. 7 The Asahi Court denied a
California court's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer
in an indemnification action against another foreign corporation.M
The Court analyzed the factors noted in both World-Wide Volkswagen
and Burger King and concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction over
the foreign manufacturer would not be "reasonable" since it would
impose a significant burden on the foreign defendant called to litigate
in the United States. 89 Further, the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum state in the California court's exercise of jurisdiction were
slight9° and the interests of the several states in the efficient resolution of the dispute were minimal because the procedural and substantive policies implicated by the Asahi litigation were those of other
nations. 91 Yet, despite explicit consideration of fairness and interest

the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. Id. at 475-76. After these
contacts have been established, the Court may consider additional factors, such as the burden on
the defendant, the plaintiffs interest in a convenient forum, and the interests of the forum and
the several states in efficient resolution of the dispute, to determine whether the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with "fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 476-77. The Court did note
that "[tihese considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness ofjurisdiction upon a
lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be necessary." Id. at 477 (citing, inter
alia, McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24). The clear implication of this admission, however, is that some
degree of minimum contacts always will be necessary. World-Wide also had listed these
considerations, stating that 'the burden on the defendant, while always a'primary concern, will in
an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors...." World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 292. The BurgerKing Court only briefly discussed application of these factors to the
case before it, however; the Court preferred to analyze the assertion of jurisdiction purely in
terms of the minimum contacts test. See text accompanying note 82.
86. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
87. See note 85.
88. In Asahi, a California resident was injured and his wife killed when the motorcycle on
which they were riding exploded following a collision. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06. The plaintiff
sued the manufacturer of the motorcycle tire, alleging that an explosion of the rear tire was
responsible for the accident. Id. at 106. Among the named defendants was Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube. Id. Cheng Shin filed a crosscomplaint seeking indemnification from the manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Id. The
underlying tort claims settled, leaving only the indemnification claim between the foreign
defendants. Id.
89. Id. at 114. The Court noted that significant weight should lie given to the unique
burdens faced by a defendant who must litigate in a foreign legal system when evaluating the
reasonableness of extending the reach of personal jurisdiction across national borders. Id.
90. The Asahi Court noted that after minimum contacts are established, the interests of the
plaintiff and the forum often will justify even significant burdens placed on the defendant. Id.
The Court concluded, however, that the only claim remaining in Asahi, an indemnification action
between foreign manufacturers in which the forum state had no significant interest, was not
sufficient to justify the burdens placed on the defendant by the California court's exercise of
jurisdiction. Id.
91. Id.at115.
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factors, minimum contacts remained the foundational inquiry. 92 Asahi
reaffirmed the World-Wide purposeful availment test 9 and rejected
the mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce as a
94
basis for jurisdiction.
The 1990 reaffirmation of transient jurisdiction in Burnham v.
Superior Court,5 restored the presence and power framework first
The Burnham Court upheld
articulated in Pennoyer in 1877.9
jurisdiction over a New York resident in a divorce proceeding filed in
California. The defendant was served with process while in California
both to transact business and to visit his children.97 The Court
appears to have come full circle, only to return to Pennoyer's
sovereignty-based conceptions of jurisdiction. 98 Despite efforts such as
CBG, it appears that territoriality and power concepts continue to
In
overshadow the fairness branch of jurisdictional doctrine.
attempting to muddle through this confusion, the Ashley court

92. The Court denied jurisdiction based on its finding that the facts of the case did not
establish minimum contacts. Id. at 116.
93. Id. at 112 (holding that "[tihe 'substantial connection' ... between the defendant and the
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State') (emphasis in original) (citations

omitted).
94. Id. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia joined the portion
of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi dealing with the purposeful availment standard.
Dissenting opinions authored by Justices Brennan and Stevens found fault with the plurality's
analysis of the purposeful availment standard. Justice Brennan reiterated his position, first
expressed in his dissenting opinion in World-Wide, that delivery of a product into the stream of
commerce should itself be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id. at
117 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. 110S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
96. See Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up the
Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 105, 129 (1991) (noting that in
Burnham the Court returned to territoriality and physical presence as the bases for establishing
personal jurisdiction).
97. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109. The Ashley court considered jurisdiction based on
"presence" problematic because it appears to grant each state too great a jurisdictional reach.
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 580-81. Ashley did note, however, that jurisdiction based on transient
presence, which was reaffirmed in Burnham, traditionally has not been applied to corporations;
rather, courts have required "more than a minimal quantum of in-state activity by corporate
officers and agents" to support jurisdiction. Id. at 581. When courts analyzed corporate contacts
to determine whether a corporation was amenable to jurisdiction, they viewed contacts as indices
of fairness. Id. After Pennoyer, courts began to use the fiction of "implied consent" to obtain
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations. Id. This fiction incorporated notions of "presence" in
the forum, a state interest in regulating activities that produce effects within the forum, and
concerns about fairness to nonresident corporate defendants, measured by the defendant's
quantum of contacts with the forum state. Id.
98. "To determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due
process, we have long relied on the principles traditionally followed by American courts in
marking out the territorial limits of each State's authority." Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
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doubted whether "a unitary, coherent jurisdictional due process
standard" currently existed. 99
V. RETURN TO THE ASHLEY LITIGATION: A REVISED APPROACH TO
JURISDICTION IN MASS TORT LITIGATION

A. The Uniqueness of a Mass Tort and the Ashley Situation
The court in Ashley attempted to supply this coherent
jurisdictional standard for mass tort litigation.
The Ashley
modification, however, must be analyzed in light of the unique factual
situation confronting the court: mass tort litigation involving multiple
defendants scattered throughout the United States.1°° The court noted
several characteristics that define a "mass tort"; °l these
characteristics hinder efficient judicial resolution of mass tort
litigation by making it difficult for plaintiffs successfully to bring a
tort action against a defendant manufacturer and receive
compensation for their injuries.10 2 The court observed that despite
these difficulties, no federal legislation exists to oversee mass tort
litigation,1°8 leaving the responsibility for ensuring compensation of
mass tort victims to the courts and state legislatures.1°4

99. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 573 (citing BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 471-78 (listing alternative
formulations)).
100. The Ashley court defined a "true" mass tort as one which 'typically involve[s] the torts
of a post-industrial age, the so-called mass toxic torts .... " Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 561-62. The
Ashley court did qualify its definition, however, by asserting that "not all toxic torts have required

doctrinal innovation and some non-toxic torts have." Id. at 562.
101. The Ashley court cited the following factors:
(1) geographically widespread exposure to potentially harmful agents that (2) affects a
large or indeterminate number of plaintiffs, (3) possibly over long time periods, even generations, (4) in different ways such that (5) there is difficulty in establishing a general
theory of causation and (6) an inability to link a particular defendant's actions to a particular plaintiffs injuries, as well as (7) difficulty in determining the number of potentially
responsible defendants and (8) in determining their relative culpability, if any, which
often results in (9) multiple litigations that burden the courts and cause huge transactional costs, including heavy legal fees, and (10) which threatens the financial ability of
many companies or of whole industries to respond to traditional damage awards.
Id. Whether Ashley's test would apply to other "mass toxic torts," such as asbestos litigation,
without some modification is unclear.
102. Id.
103. The legal community has begun to address the need for this legislation. See American
Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project, Tentative Draft No. 3 (March 31, 1992); notes 176-80
and accompanying text.
104. See Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 196-200 (cited in note 15) (proposing a
federal legislative solution to ensure compensation of DES victims).
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Mass tort litigation is riddled with difficulties: causation and
proof problems; difficulty in establishing a "locus" state; complex
questions concerning jurisdiction, choice of law, and damage apportionment; the danger of duplicative litigation; excessive punitive
damage awards that result in defendant bankruptcy; inconsistent
results and damage awards for similarly situated plaintiffs; and overcrowded court dockets.105 These difficulties have inspired modification
of traditional tort law.1°6 No corresponding modifications have been
made in traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine, however, to accommodate the unique problems of complex litigation.10 7 The Ashley court
formulated a practical and efficient solution to fill this gap in personal
jurisdiction law in the unique setting of mass toxic tort litigation.
B. The Ashley Court's ProceduralApproach
1. The Ashley Departure: A Reflection of Substantive State Policy
New York, at the time of the Ashley litigation, had enacted
quasi-substantive legislation indicative of important state policies,
including a policy of providing compensation for victims of toxic
torts.10o Recognizing this policy, the Ashley court adopted an approach
it believed to be consistent with what the New York Court of Appeals
would decide in a similar factual framework.1 09 It noted that the
Court of Appeals already had taken steps to adapt traditional tort law
principles to the unique DES situation and that New York law favored
full compensation to injured plaintiffs.l °
Further, the New York Court of Appeals in Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co.,,, had adopted a Sindell-like1 market-share approach for
apportioning liability among DES defendants based on a national
market. According to Hymowitz, DES manufacturers should be held
severally liable for a share of a plaintiffs damages according to each
105. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 562.
106. Id. (recognizing modifications such as concerted action, enterprise liability, and marketshare liability). See notes 30.31 and accompanying text.
107. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 563 (acknowledging proposals for nationwide service of process
in mass litigation). The Ashley court suggested that similar considerations underlie nationwide
interpleader actions, for which nationwide jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2361, and mass
tort cases. Id.
108. Id. (citing modifications in statutes of limitations for Agent Orange and other toxic tort
cases to provide for the running of the statute from the date of discovery of the injury).
109. Id. at 571.
110. Id.at572.
111. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
112. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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defendant's share of the national market at the time of the plaintiffs
exposure.113 To allocate the costs of DES-related injuries, the
Hymowitz rule essentially converted geographically dispersed DES
manufacturers into a single national industry.14 To justify its
expansion of jurisdictional due process standards, the Ashley court
relied heavily on the policy of ensuring compensation to DES victims
that had been articulated by New York's legislature and courts.11 5
2. New York's Long-Arm Statutes
The Ashley court began its analysis by examining the New
York long-arm jurisdictional statutes. 16 These statutes provided New
York courts with jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who should
have foreseen that their tortious acts committed outside the state

113. Hymowitr, 539 N.E.2d at 1078. In contrast to the Sindell approach, however, Hymowitz
does not allow for exculpation of a defendant who can prove that it did not manufacture the DES
that injured the plaintiff. The court reasoned that such exculpation would amount to a "windfall"
when liability is apportioned according to overall risk created. Id. A defendant is excused from
liability only when it can demonstrate that "it did not participate in the marketing of DES for
pregnancy use." Id.
114. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 564. A subsequent case, however, indicated that the Hymowitz
rule may be available only to persons that have a substantial connection to New York. See Besser
v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 539 N.Y.S.2d 734, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), affd, 552 N.E.2d 171 (N.Y.
1990) (holding that a New York statute reviving time.barred DES actions did not apply to shorter
statutes of limitations that controlled causes of action arising outside New York; justifying the
decision as a means of preventing plaintiffs exposed to DES in other states from litigating in New
York).
115. Ashley found support for its holding in case law and legislation: "Hymowitz, Besser, and
the legislative modifications to New York's statutes of limitations for DES plaintiffs evince New
York's intent to provide as full a recovery as is practicable to those of its residents injured by
DES. New York and its residents therefore have a strong interest in the assertion of jurisdiction
[over nonresident defendants in DES litigation in New York]." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 576.
Ashley concluded that "the continued reliance [on a territorial contacts requirement] creates
significant obstacles to [the] resolution [of mass tort cases]. This is particularly evident in a case
such as [Ashley], where New York substantive law empowers plaintiffs to bring in all industry
participants to achieve a full and economical resolution of their lawsuits, yet jurisdictional law
may prevent the very result envisioned by the state's substantive, remedial and procedural laws."
Id. at 586-87.
116. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (C.P.LR.) §§ 301 and 302(a)(3) provided two
bases for jurisdiction over defendants by New York courts. C.P.L.R. § 301 granted jurisdiction
based on consent and on "continuous and systematic" business activities within the forum. More
importantly, C.P.L.R. § 302, New York's long-arm provision, did not extend to the limits of
jurisdiction permissible under the Constitution. Section 302(a)(3)('i), however, specifically
provided for jurisdiction over defendant companies who have conducted no business in New York
but whose out-of-state tortious acts have caused injury to a person within the state, so long as the
defendant "should have expected its act to have consequences in the state and it derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 569. Ashley
noted that the "reasonable expectation' element of section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires that a defendant
foresee that its tortious act will have some consequences in New York, although not necessarily
the consequences that occurred." Id. at 570. See id. at 569 for a detailed analysis and interpretation of the New York long-arm provisions.
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would have consequences within the state. 117 Lower New York courts,
anxious to avoid conflict with constitutional due process limits on
jurisdiction, had incorporated into the statutory jurisdiction standard
the purposeful availment test established in World-Wide Volkswagen
and its progeny. 18
The Ashley court, however, rejected the reasonable expectation
and purposeful availment requirements, finding them inappropriate
tests for jurisdiction."19 When section 302(a)(3)(ii) is interpreted as
written, the court found that it provides a workable framework for
efficient resolution of jurisdictional questions in mass tort litigation. 120
Ashley held that a DES manufacturer's participation in the national
marketing of a generic drug should lead it to "reasonably expect" this
act of selling to have "consequences in the state" as required under
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii).' 2' The court was dissatisfied, however, with
existing case law interpreting section 302(a)(3)(ii) as applied to tort
litigation. Based on its analysis of policy and existing case law interpreting New York's long-arm statutes, the court concluded that
Hymowitz, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, and legislative
policy must be interpreted to favor the national market-share jurisdictional analysis and the adoption of several liability.
Having concluded that Hymowitz and C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii)
support a broad base for New York courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over DES defendants, the Ashley court turned to an analysis of
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting due process limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction. The court attempted to draw common elements from the confusing and often contradictory standards
enunciated in Supreme Court jurisdictional case law from Pennoyer to
Burnham.122

117. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 569.
118. Id.at571.
119. The court found the reasonable expectation test circular because the reasonableness of a
defendant's expectation is entirely dependent on the content of the forum state's jurisdiction laws.
Id. This statement reflects the observation made by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in
World.Wide that the "reasonable anticipation" test 'begs the question .... A defendant cannot
know if his actions will subject him to jurisdiction in another State until we have declared what

the law of jurisdiction is." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 571.

121. Id. at 572. The court concluded that the fact that DES manufacturers engaged in
national marketing of the drug should have alerted them to the likelihood that their actions
would have "economic and trade flow consequences" throughout the nation, including New York.
Id. Hymowitz simply recognized that this feature of the DES market necessarily influenced an

equitable apportionment of liability among DES defendants. Id.
122. See id. at 573-74 (collecting authorities that reflect the lack of a unitary, coherent
jurisdictional standard).
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C. Difficulties in Applying CurrentJurisdictionDoctrine to Mass Torts
The Ashley court concluded that it could not apply traditional
jurisdiction doctrine directly to mass tort litigation without serious
difficulties. It summarily rejected the applicability of the stream-ofcommerce theory to the litigation before it,'2 since the stream-ofcommerce paradigm prohibits a court from exercising jurisdiction
based exclusively on the contacts created between a forum and a
defendant through the operation of a national chain of distribution.124
The Ashley court found this limitation on jurisdiction unworkable in
the mass tort context.
DES litigation is distinguishable from
traditional tort litigation in that it does not consist simply of actions
by an individual plaintiff or plaintiffs against a local or foreign
business; many foreign entities reasonably could claim that they never
anticipated their business dealings to affect New York residents.125
DES defendants, in contrast, manufactured generic goods and
participated in a national market.' 26
The stream-of-commerce
rationale, as applied to DES litigation, effectively converts an issue of
venue into a restriction on the assertion of jurisdiction,127 a restriction
the Ashley court found inappropriate.
More importantly, the Ashley court rejected the Asahi and
World-Wide purposeful availment paradigms, developed in traditional
product liability actions by single plaintiffs against single defendants,
as inapplicable in the context of mass DES litigation. 2 8 Rather,

123. Id. at 571.
124. Id. at 574.
125. Compare Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in the Post-World-Wide Volkswagen
Era-Usinga Market Analysis to Determine the Reach of Jurisdiction,60 Wash. L. Rev. 155, 164
(1984) (proposing a market analysis for assertion of jurisdiction in stream-of-commerce cases in

which jurisdiction exists if the defendant receives a "sizable benefit' from the forum's markets).
126. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 572. Alternatively, the Ashley court stated that DES manufacturers, by virtue of their 'participation in the national marketing of a generic drug, should
'reasonably expect' [their] act[s] of selling in the national market 'to have... consequences in the
[forum] state." Id. Ashley placed great emphasis on the fact that the defendant manufacturers
knowingly participated in and encouraged the development of a national market for DES that inevitably had consequences throughout the country, including New York. Id.
127. Id. at 575. Compare Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "FairPlay and Substantial
Justice" How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standardfor Personal Jurisdiction, 18
Hastings Const. L. Q. 441, 451 (1991) (noting that "the Ninth Circuit 'recognizes that once
minimum contacts have been established, inconvenience to the defendant is more appropriately
handled not as a challenge to jurisdiction, but as a factor supporting a change in venue") (citing
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct.
1522 (1991)).
128. Ashley, 789 F. 8upp. at 575. See Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 502, 526 (cited in note 4)
(declaring that a "foreseeability" analysis is appropriate in the context of small, local retailers of
inexpensive goods, but cannot logically be extended to "large, multi-state seller[s] of high-priced
goods," particularly when the forum does not inconvenience or burden the defendant. The author
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Ashley expressed a clear preference for the multi-factor
reasonableness test alluded to in World-Wide Volkswagen and applied
in Asahi.129
The jurisdiction case most closely resembling mass tort litigation, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,13° supported a finding of jurisdiction. Keeton is not perfectly analogous to Ashley's mass tort
situation, however, because, in contrast to Keeton, not all DES
defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of the
forum state's laws.131
Traditional jurisdiction doctrine developed with no consideration of the unique demands of mass litigation. The Ashley court found
it difficult to accommodate mass tort jurisdictional issues into the
literal requirements of tests such as purposeful availment. 131 Supreme
Court jurisdiction case law did not provide answers sufficient to
resolve jurisdictional questions in DES tort litigation; s3 the Ashley
court concluded that modifications of jurisdictional analysis are no less
appropriate than substantive and quasi-substantive modifications of
13 4
tort law already made by legislatures and state courts.
The Ashley court sought a conceptual framework for analyzing
personal jurisdiction that both accommodates the distinct
requirements of mass tort litigation and respects the traditional nexus
requirement present in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence since
Pennoyer. Jurisdiction jurisprudence since International Shoe has
continued to incorporate two distinct inquiries, sovereignty and

concludes that large, transjurisdictional corporations are less likely to be inconvenienced by
litigation in a distant forum.).
129. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 575.
130. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the plaintiff, a New York resident, sued Hustler
magazine for libel in New Hampshire. Because the plaintiff alleged injury in every state, the
Court focused its analysis on whether it would be fair to compel the defendant to litigate in New
Hampshire. Id. at 775. The Court upheld jurisdiction, although the publication had only de
minimis contacts with the forum, because New Hampshire had an interest in redressing injuries
that occurred within the state and the several states had an interest in efficient adjudication of
the action in a single proceeding. Id. at 776-77.
131. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 576. Ashley concluded, however, that the establishment of a
national DES market created a sufficient "indirect benefit" arising from New York's markets to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction over all DES defendants on the grounds of purposeful availment. Id. The court claimed that "the United States constitutes a common economic pond that
knows no state boundaries. A substantial interjection of products at any point of the national
market has ripple effects in all parts of the market." Id. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the appropriate reach of jurisdiction premised
on stream-of-commerce-based contacts).
132. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 576.
133. Id. See also Lither L. McDougal, JudicialJurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest
Analysis, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1982) (arguing that "states should embrace jurisdictional
doctrines that are flexible enough to react to the facts of any case").
134. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 576.
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fairness, both of which require some territorial nexus 3 5 between the
defendant and the forum state.1,36 Although the Ashley court agreed
that some forum-litigation nexus is appropriate in the jurisdictional
analysis, it disagreed with the traditional analysis that requires a
territorial nexus to satisfy the fairness inquiry. 137
The Ashley court concluded that a nexus requirement is more
appropriate as an element of sovereignty inquiry than as a factor in
evaluating fairness to the defendant and that the nexus requirement
should be eliminated entirely from the fairness inquiry.1 * Ashley
distinguished Pennoyer and its progeny on the basis of the character of
this nexus requirement. Rather than demanding a territorial nexus
with the forum state, the court concluded that a nexus sufficient to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction exists if the forum state has a
tangible interest in litigation founded on the acts of a nonresident
defendant, despite the fact that those acts may not have occurred
within the state. 39 Ashley thus established, as an appropriate nexus,
a state interest rather than a territorial connection. The Ashley
analysis encompasses both a fairness-to-defendants inquiry, no longer
evaluated solely on the basis of forum-defendant contacts, and a
sovereignty inquiry, centering around the forum state's interest in
asserting jurisdiction.
The traditional two-pronged sovereignty and fairness analysis
evolved from cases with, at most, a few parties on each side. The
Supreme Court never has had occasion to apply its jurisdictional
analysis to mass tort litigation arising from the national marketing of
a generic good. 40 The Ashley court declared that the "irrationality" of
135. The term 'territorial nexus" is used here to indicate the forum-defendant contact
requirement introduced in InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316, and alluded to in World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93, as protecting the concept of interstate federalism implicit in the
Constitution.
136. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 585. A forum's assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant is
deemed 'fair' only if the defendant has sufficient territorial contacts with the forum state.
Additionally, the sovereignty prong is satisfied and the state is deemed to have an "interest*in
the litigation (and thus is able to assert jurisdiction without affront to another sovereign state)
only if such territorial contacts are present. Id.
137. The Ashley court claimed that a territorial nexus requirement remained only in the
fairness element of the jurisdictional analysis. The court concluded that modern jurisdiction
jurisprudence requires only an interest nexus in the sovereignty inquiry to support jurisdiction.
Id. at 584-85.
138. Id. at 579. Ashley would not validate a contact or nexus between the defendant and the
forum state as a means to protect the defendant's interest in a fair forum.
139. Id. at 580. This requirement stems from the belief that 'a state may not impose
obligations on nonresidents without a reason.... [A] state [must] have at least some interest in a
controversy before it may demand that a non-resident incur the burden of defending a suit in the
state." Id. at 585.
140. Id. The closest the Court has come to analyzing personal jurisdiction doctrine in the
context of mass litigation was Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Shutts
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a territorial nexus requirement is most evident in mass tort
litigation 14 and concluded that the prevailing jurisdictional analysis
could not be applied to such litigation.'4
D. The Ashley Test for PersonalJurisdictionin Mass Tort Litigation
The Ashley court found it necessary to alter existing jurisdictional standards to meet the unique difficulties of DES litigation.1 43
The court therefore fashioned a two-prong test1 " that focuses first on
the forum state's interest in the litigation 45 and then on the burden to
the defendant in being called to litigate in the forum.'4 The Ashley
test not only embraces the components reflected in Supreme Court
pronouncements on the fairness standard, 14 but also incorporates
proposals made by scholars and critics urging the abandonment of the
territorial nexus as a basis for personal jurisdiction.148

indicated the Court's willingness to stretch traditional jurisdictional standards to accommodate
the unique factual setting of mass litigation. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 585. See also text accompanying notes 63-67.
141. Because mass tort actions generally are brought against large corporate defendants, the
theory that a territorial nexus is a reliable indicator of convenience is particularly weak. See
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 586.
142. Id. at 585 (rejecting the territorial nexus requirement as inappropriate to a fairness
inquiry in the mass tort context). The Ashley court held that incorporation of a territorial nexus
requirement into the jurisdictional analysis was "an historical accident," and that a "territorial
nexus doctrine is a particularly inadequate mechanism for protecting mass producers from undue
litigation burdens." Id. Rather, the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the law of venue
protect defendants against unfairness and inconvenience. Id. at 586.
143. The court stated, "Given that New York law has evolved to promote the efficient
resolution of mass DES torts, and given the problems of applying prevailing traditional
jurisdictional concepts to such cases, a modification of established standards to determine the
constitutionality of jurisdictional statutes that incorporates an interest nexus inquiry but not a
territorial nexus inquiry is necessary in the DES context-and perhaps in other mass tort cases.*
Id. at 587.
144. See text accompanying note 11.
145. 'Principle I incorporates the 'interest' nexus requirement of cases like Keeton, Burger
King and Asahi ....
The first principle also links jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiries."
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 588. See notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
146. The second factor measures the fairness of requiring the defendant to litigate in the
forum state, focusing on the specific hardships to the defendant. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 589.
Ashley stated that, under the mass tort jurisdiction test, a court will presume that the assertion of
jurisdiction is fair 'unless the defendant informs it of potential litigation burdens and the desirability of transfer or dismissal." Id.
147. See, for example, Ins. Corp. of Irelandv. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG), 456
U.S. 694 (1982); McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
148. See, for examtle, McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 133). A comparison of the
Ashley test with the fairness-centered jurisdictional statute proposed by Professor Weintraub
highlights the role that state interests play in the Ashley formulation. See Weintraub, 63 Or. L.
Rev. at 527-28 (cited in note 4).
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More importantly, the Ashley test is not a complete departure

from Supreme Court precedent. 149 Rather, the test reflects distinct
strands of jurisdiction jurisprudence that appear throughout the
Court's jurisdiction cases. Ashley attempts to identify those strands of
jurisdictional analysis that are most germane to the litigation before
the court and to organize those factors into an intelligible, flexible test
for establishing jurisdiction over DES, and perhaps other mass tort,
defendants.
Significantly, the Ashley test reflects proposals offered by
several of the Justices in jurisdiction cases. In his dissenting opinion
in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan posits that the Court's
purposeful availment test is circumscribed too narrowly and that even

the International Shoe minimum contacts test may be outdated. 15°
'Indeed, the test proposed by Justice Brennan is nearly identical to
that established in Ashley: he focuses on inconvenience to the
defendant and the strength of the forum state's interest rather than
on contacts.15'
The Ashley test further finds support in Mullane v. Central

Hanover Trust Co.,152 which emphasized the importance of the forum
state's interest in the litigation and the enforcement of its own laws
and social policies, and in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,153 which

underscored the importance of the burden inquiry in the jurisdictional
analysis.1 4 Significantly, Ashley does not propose a complete departure from traditional personal jurisdiction analysis in all litigation

149. The court in Ashley proclaimed that '[t]he mass tort standard does incorporate several
factors acknowledged in Supreme Court case law and by academic commentators as relevant to
the constitutional inquiry.' Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 587.
150. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 308 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Justice Brennan's test resembles Ashley in a number of respects. Significantly, both
tests would diminish the importance of contacts if some other interest, such as the forum state's
interest in the litigation, supported the exercise of jurisidiction. Similarly, both tests allow the
lack of any real injury to the defendant's consitutionally protected interests to weigh in favor of
the fairness of jurisdiction. In words remarkably similar to the Ashley test, Justice Brennan
concluded that "[i]f a plaintiff can show that his chosen forum State has a sufficient interest in the
litigation.. . then the defendant who cannot show some real injury to a constitutionally protected
interest.., should have no constitutional excuse not to appear." Id. at 300-01, 309, 312 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The Ashley test also bears remarkable similarities to the jurisdictional analysis
proposed by Justice Black in Hansonv. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-59 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the forum state should have jurisd_tion over a nonresident defendant in a case
in which the state has a significant interest unless litigation there would burden the defendant so
heavily that it would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice').
152. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
153. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
154. The Ashley court read Shutts as a Supreme Court recognition of the need for
modification of the jurisdictional analysis in the context of mass litigation. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at
576-77.
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contexts. Rather, the Ashley test is narrowly tailored to accommodate
the unique circumstances surrounding DES litigation.
Finally, Ashley responds to proposals offered by many scholars
calling for modification of personal jurisdiction doctrine to reflect both
modern social realities and the appropriate role of the Due Process
Clause in protecting against burdens placed on individual litigants.155
The Ashley test is remarkably similar to jurisdictional analyses
suggested by numerous scholars who seek to clarify the roles of
sovereignty, interests, and fairness in the jurisdiction inquiry.1 1
Significantly, Ashley represents a judicious first step toward
modification of personal jurisdiction doctrine along the lines suggested
by these commentators. Ashley, however, does not propose to expand
its analysis beyond the mass tort litigation scenario and thus represents a more discerning approach to modification of jurisdictional
analysis. The Ashley test may provoke renewed attention to the
proper scope of the personal jurisdiction inquiry. However, the court
was unwilling to extend its analysis beyond the scope of the litigation
before it, preferring to leave further modification of the doctrine to the
Supreme Court.15
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASHLEY HOLDING

The Ashley court adopted a fairly cautious approach, recognizing that it could not entirely abandon well-established personal
jurisdiction doctrine when developing a due process standard for mass
tort litigation.16 Rather, the court stated that its aim was to clarify
the role of the nexus requirement in Due Process Clause cases
involving new substantive law.159 Thus, Ashley claimed to adopt a
conservative stance, despite its willingness to rewrite longstanding
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.160

155. See, for example, McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 30 (cited in note 133) (suggesting that
if the defendant will not be unduly burdened by litigation in the forum selected by the plaintiff,
the forum state should have the authority to decide the dispute).
156. These proposals are explored more fully in Part VI.B. below.
157. See Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 587; note 202.
158. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 577 (citations omitted).
159. Id. See also notes 217-25 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Due Process
Clause in personal jurisdiction analysis).
160. Ashley suggests that its position will be adopted by the New York Court of Appeals.

Ashley, 789.F. Supp. at 571.
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A. The Impact of the Ashley Test on DES Litigation
The court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratoriesel determined that a
market-share approach is most just and most likely to provide
compensation to an injured plaintiff. Sindell recognized, however,
that the market-share theory departs significantly from traditional
tort law principles and thus concluded that it should be limited to the
unique factual context of DES litigation.162 Likewise, the Ashley test
is tailored carefully to meet the needs and satisfy the equities of DES
litigation. For this reason, the Ashley personal jurisdiction standard
should be extended to other instances of mass tort litigation only with
3
great caution. 16
Unlike Sindell, the Ashley court did not tie its jurisdictional
framework to the market-share theory of liability. Rather, the
jurisdictional concepts proposed by the Ashley court are based on the
need for specifically tailored, guiding principles in multiple defendant,
mass tort litigation. Asbestos and other types of mass tort litigation
share enough characteristics with DES litigation to make a broader
jurisdictional standard desirable. Among such considerations are the
burdens of identification; the desirability of resolving complex,
multiparty litigation in a single, efficient proceeding; and the states'
common interest in providing compensation to severely injured
plaintiffs.
By virtue of strengthening the enforceability and applicability
of the Sindell market-share liability theory, the Ashley holding enhances policies such as the desire to provide compensation to DES
victims. In fortifying the applicability of market-share liability by
ensuring jurisdiction over all manufacturers named, the Ashley test
has begun to eradicate ill effects such as overdeterrence and liability
in the absence of moral blame that can flow from a market-share
liability test imposed on a small number of manufacturers. Critics of
the market-share theory often focus on the potential for imposing
liability in the absence of fault and consequently overdeterring manufacturers in cases in which not all possible defendants are before the
161. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). See notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
162. 'Where, as here, all defendants produced a drug from an identical formula and the

manufacturer of the DES which caused plaintiffs injuries cannot be identified through no fault of
plaintiff, a modification of the rule of Summers is warranted." Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936. See also
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (1989). For a detailed
discussion of the limitations of market.share liability, see Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 677-79 (cited
in note 18).
163. The market-share liability test has not been applied to asbestos litigation. See Downey

and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 188 n.102 (cited in note 15) (distinguishing DES from asbestos
litigation).

218

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[47:189

court. 18 4 The Ashley test undermines such objections to market-share

liability by enabling plaintiffs (and cross-claiming defendants) to join
significantly greater numbers of defendants; the greater the number
of defendants before the court, the more equitable the distribution of
liability resulting from application of a market-share theory. 16 5
The court in Sindell noted that DES plaintiffs in a marketshare liability proceeding must join defendants representing only a
"substantial share" of the relevant market. 166 The Sindell court
admitted that the market-share approach may result in liability that
is slightly out of proportion to the mathematical market share;
however, the court noted that defendants named by the plaintiff
would be free to cross-complain against other DES manufacturers to
ensure that the maximum number of manufacturers possible are
before the court.167 Assuming the desirability of a market-share
proceeding as an equitable method for allocating liability,6 8 the Ashley
test enhances the fairness of a market-share proceeding by ensuring
that the forum can obtain jurisdiction over all manufacturers still in
existence. Thus, the Ashley approach approximates the policies
underlying Congress's grant of nationwide jurisdiction in federal
interpleader proceedings. 16 9 Jurisdiction over all defendants who
should be before the court guarantees a more equitable distribution of
liability. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Sindell argued that

164. One critic has stated that '[pilaintiffs can respond to the distortion [of liability]
argument by contending that defendants are free to bring in third party defendants by crosscomplaint if they wish to have a larger market share represented in the suit. The problem with
this response is that many manufacturers may not be amenable to suit in the jurisdiction where
the plaintiff brings the action." Fischer, 34 Vand. L. Rev. at 1646 (cited in note 39). Professor
Fischer claims that the market-share theory results in "inherent distortion of defendants' actual
liability.- Id.
165. The Ashley test further will eliminate any unfairness arising from deliberate marketing
strategies of certain DES manufacturers. As Professor Fischer has noted, "some DES
manufacturers intentionally catered to local and regional markets. Therefore, a manufacturer
who produced a high percentage of the DES used in the locality where the plaintiffs mother
obtained the drug may not do business in the jurisdiction where suit is filed." Id. at 1646-47
(footnotes omitted). A jurisdiction test based on an interest-and-fairness analysis rather than a
contacts, doing business, or purposeful availment standard will help ensure that defendants are
not insulated from liability because of the fortuity of marketing and distribution strategies.
166. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
167. Id.
168. Compare Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 196-200 (cited in note 15) (proposing a
legislative solution to the problem of compensation for DES victims).
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335, 1397, 2361 (1988). One scholar has noted that these provisions
"indicate] that the Supreme Court's territorial conception of due process limitations may not be
absolute." McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 23 (cited in note 133) (footnote omitted). For an
interesting discussion of a proposed revision to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
would provide for nationwide service of process in federal question (and perhaps certain diversity)
cases, see Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide PersonalJurisdictionin All Federal Question Cases:
A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1117 (1989).
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manufacturers who are amenable to suit in the forum state will face a
disproportionately high percentage of the market-share liability.17°
Application of the Ashley standard will help eradicate unfair
distribution of liability based solely on lack of minimum contacts with
the forum.
Further, under the Ashley test, plaintiffs more likely will
receive full compensation. 171 If the market-share theory dictates that
a plaintiff may recover from each defendant only that percentage of
the judgment equal to its percentage share of the DES market, 72 the
more generous Ashley standard will allow plaintiffs to recover their
fair share of the judgment from defendants previously not amenable
to jurisdiction; defendants no longer will be insulated from liability by
lack of jurisdiction under a contacts test.173
The Sindell court asserted that an alternative liability theory
may apply to DES litigation when it is substantially likely that the
defendant who supplied the drug that injured the plaintiff was before
the court. 74 A broader jurisdictional standard would help ensure that
all (or at least all available) defendants could be brought before the
court. In such a case, a court could apply more traditional principles
75
of tort law to the resolution of liability.
Perhaps more importantly, the Ashley decision represents a
significant step toward establishing jurisdictional and other rules for
complex litigation, a need for which the legal community has
recognized and currently is addressing.176 As the incidence of complex
170. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 940 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
171. "Given the Hymowitz court's decision to forgo joint and several liability, a DES
plaintiffs full recovery would be frustrated if all manufacturers for pregnancy use could not be
brought into court." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 572.
172. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 (holding that "liability of DES producers is several
only, and should not be inflated when all participants in the market are not before the court in a
particular case").
173. See Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 673 (cited in note 18) (arguing that liability in proportion

to market share 'would give plaintiffs incentive to bring in as many defendants as practical, so
courts could be reasonably certain that all defendants who could be efficiently joined were
present") (footnote omitted).

174. Downey and Gulley, 4 J. Legal Med. at 183 (cited in note 15).
175. See id. at 184 (stating that it is "critical to ensure that at least one defendant [is] before
the court, whose breach of a duty owing to the plaintiff resulted in plaintiffs harm, before the
burden of causation [can] justifiably be shifted to the defendants" under a theory of alternative
liability).
176. See, for example, American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project (cited in note
103). Judge Weinstein, the author of the Ashley opinion, currently is serving on the Complex

Litigation Project's Advisory Committee.

The numerous issues and problems raised by the

increasing incidence of complex litigation are beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For a
comprehensive treatment of the problems of multiparty, multiforum litigation, see Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., and Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 7 (1986) (proposing the creation of federal subject matter

jurisdiction to resolve complex, scattered litigation).
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litigation increases, 177 courts more frequently are confronted with
problems unique to mass litigation. The judicial system currently
faces a crucial problem: the unavailability of any one forum in which
scattered but related litigation can be consolidated. 178 The restrictions
imposed on state court jurisdiction by World-Wide Volkswagen and its
progeny often are an underlying cause of the system's inability to
consolidate complex, multiforum litigation. 179 Ashley proposes a singular solution to this difficulty, at least in the context of DES litigation.
By broadening the jurisdictional reach of state courts in mass tort
litigation, the Ashley test facilitates consolidation of what otherwise
would amount to scattered individual actions.a °
B. The Impact of the Ashley Test on JurisdictionalTheory
The Ashley test also carries implications for general personal
jurisdiction doctrine. A significant body of commentary suggests the
need to revise current personal jurisdiction analysis to distinguish
sovereignty and fairness concerns and to clarify the meaning and role
bf the Due Process Clause in jurisdiction analysis.sI

177. The incidence of "complex" (multiparty, multiforum) litigation has increased greatly in

recent years, due largely to continued improvements in transportation, industrial growth, and
increasingly nationalized markets. Current rules on joinder, jurisdiction, and choice of law do not
address adequately the problems engendered by mass litigation.
178. Rowe and Sibley, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 176).
179. See id. (noting that "related proceedings arising out of the same events are often
conducted as a multi-ring circus in two or more forums.... [Clonsolidation cannot take place in
the courts of any one state because of the due process holding against state court jurisdiction in
World-Wide Volkswagen") (footnote omitted).
180. The American Law Institute proposes yet another solution to the problems arising from
multiparty, multiforum litigation: the creation and adoption of federal legislation permitting
consolidation of complex litigation in a single forum. See American Law Institute, Complex
Litigation Project § 8 at 326-46 (cited in note 103) (setting forth the personal jurisdiction
provision). The ALI proposal would (1) allow the 'transferee" state to exercise jurisdiction
according to current constitutional limits, based on contacts with a state participating in the
complex litigation legislation, and (2) permit nationwide jurisdiction in the 'transferee" state if
authorized by Congress, based on a "national contacts test." Id. at 335-36, 341. A comprehensive
scheme for the management of complex litigation 'will lead to considerable savings of judicial
resources, and increased fairness...." Id. at 344. The Reporter's Notes to Comment f explain the
ALI's willingness to relax the contacts standard for complex litigation: "[Crossing state
boundaries does not accurately measure the practical degree of hardship or inconvenience to
litigants because their circumstances may be so different. State boundaries cannot always be
used as a substitute for fairness. Actual hardship on the litigants should guide... in deciding
whether a particular litigant should be exempt from transfer for consolidation." Id. at 346.
181. In particular, the decision in World-Wide Volkswagen, which suggested that sovereignty
considerations alone could divest a court of judicial jurisdiction (see notes 75-77 and
accompanying text), sparked a rash of scholarly criticism of the Court's jurisdiction formulation.
See, for example, Braveman, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 533 (cited in note 62); Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1112 (cited in note 44).
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1. The Sovereignty Focus, the Contacts Requirement, and Interstate
Federalism
Many scholars recommend revising personal jurisdiction doctrine to eliminate the contacts requirement that undergirds the con182
cept of interstate federalism recognized in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Rather than a contacts-based inquiry, these scholars propose that the
jurisdictional analysis focus on the individual interests implicated by
the assertion of jurisdiction-namely, fairness to the litigants, which
generally is analyzed in terms of the burden8 or inconvenience to the
parties.
The minimum contacts requirement 84 arose from the Supreme
Court's concern with the interstate federalism concepts it has found
implicit in the Constitution.185 The Court's insistence on territorial
contacts confuses notions of territorialism and sovereignty. The

182. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodseon, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). See also
Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1115 (cited in note 44) (proposing a jurisdiction test that examines
three factors: inconvenience to the defendant, inconvenience to the plaintiff, and forum state
interests); McDougal, 35 Vend. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 133); Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 486-87
n.14 (cited in note 4) (listing scholarly proposals for fairness-based jurisdiction standards that do
not take into account territorial boundaries).
Other commentators disagree, asserting that a contacts requirement *remains essential to
personal jurisdiction analysis. See, for example, Mollie A. Murphy, PersonalJurisdictionand the
Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisaland a Revised Approach, 77 Ky. L. J. 243, 284 (198889) (arguing that "jurisdiction analysis must... recognize the existence of sovereignty limits and
the consistency of the Court's 'purposeful' connection requirement with those limitations").
Murphy claims that although convenience to the defendant is an important element of fairness,
jurisdiction ultimately is fair only when the defendant has an "adequate connection" with the
forum state. Id. at 286. Murphy concludes that "[t]he existence of sovereignty limitations on a
state's authority to assert jurisdiction is readily supported whether on the basis of structural
considerations or the due process clause itself." Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
183. Professor Redish notes several elements of the possible "burden" on a defendant,
including litigation inconvenience and surprise at the existence of jurisdiction. Redish, 75 Nw. U.
L. Rev. at 1133-34 (cited in note 44). Redish is not persuaded that "unfair surprise" is a valid
concern, because even surprise cannot be considered an injustice to a defendant who is not
inconvenienced by defending in the forum and is not prejudiced by the substantive law applied by
the forum state. Id. at 1134.
184. Professor McDougal describes the Court's doctrine as a "neo-territorial minimum
contacts theory." McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 59 (cited in note 133).
185. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92, stating that "[tihe concept of minimum
contacts... can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them
by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." The latter "function" is disturbing. The
requirement that defendants have some "contact" within the territorial boundaries of a state
seeking to assert jurisdiction over them misdirects the jurisdictional inquiry from its appropriate
focus on due process, which is concerned with fairness to the defendant. Certainly a defendant is
not deprived of due process of law when called to defend in a forum that is neither burdensome
nor inconvenient, because such a forum in no way hinders the defendant's ability to present a
viable defense. Contacts within a forum state, which might indicate that a particular forum is
fair, nonetheless should not serve as a substitute for meaningful due process analysis.
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requirement that a defendant have some tangible, physical contact
within a state's territorial boundaries implies that the states are
territorial units that are competent only to adjudicate matters
"touching" their territory.'8 The concept of state sovereignty is not
necessarily this limited. Ashley professes to address sovereignty
concerns by requiring not a territorial but an interest nexus among
forum, litigation, and defendant. This focus on a forum state's interest, rather than a preoccupation with territorial boundaries, both
addresses the interests of the several states as sovereign units and
recognizes that the several states can and should operate as components of a nationwide legal system with a shared interest in the reso7
lution of interstate controversies. 18
The contacts requirement would not be so troubling if the
Court did not require the existence of contacts within the territorial
boundaries of the forum state to serve as a prerequisite to the exercise
of jurisdiction. Indeed, several commentators have proposed using a
contacts inquiry to measure the fairness of asserting jurisdiction over
a nonresident'8 but have rejected a contacts requirement that, by
itself, can divest a court of jurisdiction.8 9
186. See Geoffirey C. Hazard, Jr., Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 711 (1979). Professor
Hazard presents a succinct analysis of the concept of "sovereign states" underlying the minimum
contacts requirement:
The federal union is made up of separate states; the states are endowed severally with

sovereign power to administer civil justice; state sovereignty is delimited by state territory; and only such matters as can be considered "within"the state's territory are within
the state's judicial sovereignty. In this limited view of things, the modem *minimum
contacts" principle is merely a constraint on a theory of jurisdiction that is based on a
concept of the states -as independent polities. The state court systems are thus to be
autonomous, self-sufficient, self-regarding, and preoccupied with their separate legal
existence, even at the cost of being collectively ineffective to dispose of complicated
multistate cases.
Id. at 720.

187. As Professor Hazard notes,
[O]ne can view each state's court system as a constituent of a national legal system whose
common objective is to supply an appropriate forum for every domestic case, however
complicated. Under this view, the proper measure of a state's judicial authority is not
what the state as an independent polity might legitimately do, but what it ought to do in

tacit collaboration with courts of other states in order to establish a coherent national system of civil justice.
Id.
188. Although most federal and state courts have adhered to the Supreme Court's "minimum
contacts-purposeful availment" paradigms, at least one court has refused to apply the two-tiered
contacts-and-fairness inquiry established by Burger King and World-Wide. See Abramson, 18
Hastings Const. L. Q. at 445 n.21 (cited in note 127) (noting that "[u]nlke other circuits, the Ninth
Circuit incorporates the minimum contacts analysis into its evaluation of the fairness factors.
The 'extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state' is a Ninth Circuit
factor deemed pertineit to the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction.") (quoting Rocke v.
CanadianAuto. Sport Club, 660 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1981)).
189. See, for example, Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1017 (cited in note 60) (arguing that
"[a]lthough the requirement of minimum contacts serves useful purposes ... the preservation of
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In eliminating the minimum contacts requirement from its
jurisdictional analysis, the Ashley court acknowledged that the territorial-based contacts analysis does not reflect modern social and economic activity. 190 In particular, the Ashley test recognizes the realities
of mass tort litigation, which is a product of increasingly nationalized
markets, improvements in transportation and communication, more
far-reaching advertising and distribution chains, and national marketing of a generic product by several manufacturers. The requirement
that a mass tort defendant have territorial contacts within the forum
state only serves to fragment complex litigation and prevent the
consolidation and efficient resolution of multistate controversies.
Modern social and economic realities have curtailed the importance and efficacy of a contacts requirement. 191 Moreover, the contacts
requirement is ineffective as a protector of state sovereignty interests. 192 The Supreme Court has been unable to articulate, with any
precision, the federalism interests served by a contacts analysis. 93 At
least one commentator has noted that the retention of a federalism
theme in jurisdictional analysis does not serve potential state interests, such as protection of a state's own citizens, protection of property
federalism and state sovereignty is not one of them"); McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 59 (cited in
note 133) (claiming that "It]he Supreme Court should abandon the minimum contacts approach
because contacts, apart from the interests [that] they engender, are meaningless occurrences.
Rather than totally abandoning the existing doctrines, however, the Court can shift its emphasis
to the fairness or reasonableness aspects of its doctrines.); Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 503 (cited
in note 4) (stating that "[t]he time has come to remove the federalism cloud from due process
limitations on state court jurisdiction so that the 'minimum contacts' requirement can be examined in the clear light of fairness to the defendant"). Professor Weintraub proposes that contacts
with the forum state should become relevant only if the defendant has made a prima facie
showing of unfairness. Id. at 523. Similarly, in its footnote in CBG, the Court indicated a
willingness to retain the minimum contacts standard as a measure of fairness to the defendant,
rather than as a protector of interstate sovereignty concerns. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG), 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982).
190. See McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 8 (cited in note 133) (arguing that *[b]ecause state
lines are of such little importance to the activities of the people in this country, reliance on the
territorial boundaries of states as a basic limit on the states' authority to exercise judicial jurisdiction is destructive of relevant interests").
191. As one commentator has noted, "[w]ith the diminishing importance of state borders in
personal jurisdiction doctrine, it would seem only natural that the Court would move away from
minimum contacts as a measure of personal jurisdiction. The Court's refusal to require that
plaintiffs have minimum contacts with the forum reflects the diminished importance of state
sovereignty.* Mandler, 1 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. at 71 (cited in note 4) (analyzing PhillipsPetroleum
Co. v. Shutt8, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
192. See Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1050 (cited in note 60) (stating that "the Court would be
wise to ... end the federalism theme. The theme is virtually useless as a protection for federalism
and state sovereignty.").
193. See Braveman, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. at 548-53, 562 (cited in note 62) (noting "two
possible threats to interstate harmony," an affront to the rights of each sovereign to try cases in
its own courts and a burden on interstate business transactions, and concluding that one state's
exercise of judicial jurisdiction does not pose a significant threat to important interests of its
sister states).
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located within the state, and the state's interest in regulating conduct
194
within the state.
2. The Role of State "Interests" and Choice of Law
The Ashley analysis raises significant questions about the
appropriate role of state "interests"195 in jurisdictional inquiry.
Several scholars have taken the position that "a systematic interest
analysis requires the identification of all relevant interests that potentially are at stake in a controversy." 96 According to this view, the
forum state's interest in the litigation (presumably an interest in
having the state's own law applied to the controversy to. further that
state's substantive social policies)

97

is an important consideration in

98

the jurisdiction analysis.
Other commentators have proposed
eliminating all "interest" analysis from the personal jurisdiction
194. Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1050-58 (cited in note 60). Drobak notes that a state's
interest in protecting the rights of its citizens is served fully when those citizens protect their own
rights. Therefore, a due process analysis that focuses solely on the individual interests of litigants
serves this arguable state interest fully; the state should not be permitted to assert greater rights
on behalf of its citizens than are afforded by due process. Id. at 1050. Indeed, Drobak asserts that
'it would be unconstitutional for a state to prevent its residents from defending in courts of other
states when due process would permit personal jurisdiction." Id. at 1051-52 n.145.
195. One scholar has defined "state interests" as interests existing 'whenever either the
events precipitating the controversy or the ultimate decision significantly affects the state's
people, resources, or institutions." McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 17 (cited in note 133).
Professor McDougal notes that "[tihe substantiality of a state interest in exercising jurisdiction
turns on the potential impact that a failure to exercise jurisdiction may have on the state's
internal value processes." Id. at 15.
196. See, for example, id. Professor McDougal claims that "[a] court should consider the
strength of the forum state's need to exercise judicial jurisdiction in its final accommodation of
interests in a controversy over the state's constitutional authority to have the matter litigated in
its courts." Id. Professor McDougal's "interest" analysis does not, however, take account of the
interests of individual litigants. See id. at 16.
197. Professor McDougal has identified six categories of potentially 'interested" states: "(1)
the state of residence of each claimant; (2) the-state of residence of each defendant; (3) a state in
which any of the resources that are the subject of the controversy are located; (4) states in which
all or part of the events engendering the controversy occurred; (5) states in which nonparties
whom the ultimate decision may significantly affect reside; and (6) the forum state." Id. at 18.
198. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that 'the
question whether the law of a State can be applied to a transaction is different from the question
whether the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the two are often
closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations"); Shaffer v.
Heitner,433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that "the decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws and rules should prove to be
highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy"). Compare Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1056 n.157 (cited in note 60) (arguing
that a forum state's interest in regulating the transaction at issue or applying its substantive law
to the resolution of the dispute should be considered in the initial jurisdictional inquiry);
Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 524-25 (cited in note 4) (claiming that a forum's interests, triggered
by the plaintiffs residence in the forum or the convenience of the forum when the plaintiff cannot
obtain jurisdiction over all defendants elsewhere, as well as the forum's interest in applying its
own substantive law, are relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry).
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inquiry and have suggested that states' interests in litigation be
addressed solely through choice-of-law analysis.19
The Ashley court did incorporate a "forum state interest"
analysis as the first prong of its jurisdiction standard.o° Ashley
adopted the reasoning of scholars who claim that the forum's interest
in adjudicating a dispute should be central in the determination of the
reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.20 1 Indeed, the Ashley court considered the forum's concern with

199. See, for example, Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the
Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudenceof PersonalJurisdiction,58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699,
701 (1983) (arguing that "government interests should find expression in the resolution of choiceof-law issues rather than as limitations on personal jurisdiction"); Mandler, 1 Ann. Surv. of Am. L.
at 64 (cited in note 4) (asserting that "forum state interests and state interests in substantive
policy have no impact on the costs of litigating in a particular forum and thus have no place in a
personal jurisdiction determination based solely on considerations of individual liberty") (footnote
omitted). Professor Lewis concludes that state sovereignty, whether measured in terms of
defendant-forum contacts or forum state interests, should play no role in the jurisdiction analysis:
If the sole ultimate concern of jurisdictional due process is to ensure a forum that is relatively fair as between the parties, then the presence or absence of a forum state or other
governmental interest--of whatever kind or degree and whether or not articulated
through legislation-should come to be seen as utterly irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction decision, since those interests have no necessary bearing on the single pertinent
factor of party fairness.
Lewis, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 739-40 (footnote omitted). Compare Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254
(declaring that a state "does not acquire ... jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the
controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not
choice of law."). As Hanson indicates, the Supreme Court has struggled to distinguish personal
jurisdiction and choice-of-law analyses.
200. See text accompanying note 11. Under the Ashley test, the forum state's interest in the
litigation is an important factor in determining the constitutionality of jurisdiction. This interest,
according to Ashley, largely depends upon the applicability of the forum state's law. Ashley, 789
F. Supp. at 588 (stating that "a forum state's interest in any matter will normally be determined
by reference to the policies expressed in its substantive laws"). Ashley declined to determine
"[w]hether a court can and should assert jurisdiction where mass tort choice-of-law principles
favor application of another forum's law .... " Id. Arguably, a court could exercise jurisdiction in
such a case, particularly if the forum were the only one available in which the litigation could be
resolved in a single proceeding.
Professor Redish argues that a forum state's decision to apply its own law should not itself be
sufficient to constitute a state "interest," but rather that the inquiry should focus on other
relevant factors such as "whether the party seeking a remedy is a resident of the state, whether a
decision granting or denying relief will affect state economic or regulatory policy, or whether the
decision will in any other way diminish the state's ability to protect its citizens." Redish, 75 Nw.
U. L. Rev. at 1140 (cited in note 44) (footnotes omitted). According to Redish's analysis, the
Ashley court could have asserted an interest in the litigation even if New York's substantive law
were not applicable, based on such factors as the number of plaintiffs who were New York
residents and the impact their injuries would have on New York's economic and social policy if
they did not receive compensation. See id. Compare McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 45 (cited in
note 133) (explaining that "jurisdictional policies and interests seek to allocate judicial business in
trans-state controversies properly; substantive interests deal with the application of the
appropriate policies to resolve trans-state controversies").
201. See Abramson, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 451 (cited in note 127). The Ashley test also
is consistent with the approach advocated by Professor Redish, who declares that federalism
concerns should be addressed through enhanced choice-of-law rules, yet argues that a "state
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the outcome of the litigation a crucial inquiry; this hurdle must be
overcome. before engaging in a "burdens" analysis.202 The state's interest, once demonstrated, establishes that the assertion of jurisdiction is prima facie constitutional.2° A court then may consider criteria
such as convenience and administrative feasibility in determining
whether it should retain jurisdiction. 20 4
In eliminating the minimum contacts requirement from its
jurisdictional analysis, the Ashley court implicitly recognized that pure
territorialism concerns are addressed appropriately through choice-oflaw analysis2 °5 and should not limit the reach of the forum's jurisdiction. 2° 6. One state's interests are infringed by a sister state's assertion
of jurisdiction only when the sister state applies its own substantive
law rather than the law of the state claiming an interest in the
litigation.207 Arguably, that state's interests are in no way infringed
interest" analysis may be relevant to the jurisdiction inquiry. Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 113233, 1139-42 (cited in note 44).
202. See text accompanying note 11. The Ashley court did note, however, that its test
reflects "a conservative view of precedents" and claimed that "a more radical position eliminating
the state interest requirement, thus allowing a neutral forum to accept jurisdiction, could be
developed were the Supreme Court to revisit precedent." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 587.
203. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 587. Ashley's interest requirement indicates that the forum has
the necessary "stake" in the litigation: a "legitimate concern with the outcome of the litigation."
Abramson, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 452 (cited in note 127). Professor Abramson notes that the
forum's "interest often finds expression in the need to protect a forum state's citizen or in the
forum state's interest in the application of its own law." Id. Both these concerns seem to be
present in Ashley and in DES litigation in general, particularly when the forum state has enacted
legislation indicative of a particular social policy in relation to victims of DES exposure, as had
New York. See id. at 454-55 (noting that "a state may have articulated its interest in protecting
its citizens by enacting a comprehensive statutory scheme intended to reach nonresidents in
furtherance of this interest") Further, the Supreme Court has noted that a forum state has a
significant interest in providing a convenient forum in which forum residents might seek
compensation for injuries inflicted by nonresidents. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 483 (1985). This interest is particularly strong when the economic impact of injury to forum
residents will be felt in the forum. See Abramson, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 454 & n.77.
204. The court may consider motions to transfer or dismiss the litigation based on improper
venue or forum non conveniens. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 587.
205. See Mandler, 1 Ann. Surv. of Am.L. at 72 n.148 (cited in note 4) (noting that "[t]he
constitutional source of protection for state substantive law interests would seem to be the full
faith and credit clause"); Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1123 (cited in note 44) (declaring that "[t]he
primary constitutional provision dealing with problems of interstate friction is the full faith and
credit clause").
206. Professor Weintraub analyzes the appropriate role of choice of law in the jurisdictional
inquiry, and concludes that analysis of conflicts in the substantive law of potential forum states
"should be eliminated from jurisdictional consideration by dealing with it directly. A regime of
constitutionally mandated conflicts rules that select a single law as the one permissible choice for
each transjurisdictional problem would fulfill this purpose .... At this time, [however,] the
Supreme Court is far more likely to be able to shape wise and useful jurisdictional rules than
choice-of-law rules." Weintraub, 63 Or. L. Rev. at 525 (cited in note 4). Professor Weintraub
concludes that unless serious questions of unfairness arise, a forum generally should apply its
own substantive law rather than attempting to master the law of another state. Id.
207. See Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1114 (cited in note 44):
If friction with or affront to one state does result from the exercise of jurisdiction by
another state, it is because the laws of the first state, not its courts, have been disre-
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by a sister state's assertion of jurisdiction in a conflict in which the
original state either has no interest or has expressed its interest in
substantive social policies identical to those of the forum asserting
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction inquiry, then, should focus not on
whether the exercise of jurisdiction offends a co-equal sovereign in a
federal system, but on considerations of fairness to the litigants and
the potential forum state's interest in the litigation.s8
The Ashley test most closely resembles the jurisdictional standard proposed by Professor Pamela J. Stephens. 2°9 Professor Stephens
concludes that the Court is committed to the continuing role of the
concept of sovereignty in personal jurisdiction analysis, 210 but she
proposes to address state sovereignty concerns through an analysis of
the forum's ability to apply its own substantive law, rather than
through a requirement of physical contacts within the territorial
boundaries of the forum state.21 1 Under this standard, an interest
sufficient to justify application of the forum state's law also provides
authority for the forum to assert judicial jurisdiction.212 Professor
Stephens' proposal differs from the Ashley test in only one respect:
she would balance state interests against burdens imposed on the
defendant, whereas the Ashley test establishes state interest as a prerequisite to the burden analysis.213 Ashley, however, does invite the
Supreme Court to eliminate the state interest inquiry altogether. 21 4
Under this alternative formulation, Ashley would provide for an
entirely neutral forum to assume jurisdiction over a controversy as
garded, for it is through its laws that a state's policies are brought to fruition. Thus, if the
Supreme Court is truly concerned with avoiding lateral friction within the federal system,
it should consider giving considerably closer scrutiny to a state's choice of law than to its
assertion of personal jurisdiction.
208. A detailed analysis of the appropriate relationship between personal jurisdiction and
choice of law is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. However, in analyzing the forum
state's interest, both Ashley and Professor Pamela J. Stephens consider whether the forum has an
interest in applying its own substantive, procedural, or remedial law to the litigation. See notes
209-16 and accompanying text. Ashley, more specifically, would allow a forum to assert
jurisdiction when the outcome of the litigation would "affect" or "impact... policies expressed in
the.., laws of the forum." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 587. Thus, a forum theoretically could assert
jurisdiction although it would not be bound to apply its own law, as long as the requisite 'effects"
on the forum exist. In such a scenario, concise choice-of-law rules would be of paramount
importance. Indeed, in refining jurisdictional standards, courts are certain to confront close
questions regarding the appropriate role of choice-of-law considerations in personal jurisdiction
doctrine. This analysis could very well result in improved choice-of-law rules to guide courts in
both choice of law and jurisdiction analyses.
209. See Stephens, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 105 (cited in note 96).
210. Id. at 106.
211. Id. at 107.
212. Id. at 129.
213. Id. at 134-35. Compare text accompanying note 11.
214. See note 202. If the interest analysis were eliminated from the Ashley test, Ashley
would resemble scholarly proposals to assess jurisdiction solely by reference to inconvenience to
the defendants. See, for example, Lewis, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699 (cited in note 199).
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long as the assertion of jurisdiction did not impose significant
litigation burdens on the defendants.215 Indeed, a neutral forum might
be particularly desirable in the resolution of scattered, complex
216
litigation.
3. The Due Process Clause
The Ashley test both responds to and provokes questions concerning the proper role of due process in personal jurisdiction analysis. 2 17

The Court in CBG concluded that the restrictions imposed on

state court jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen ultimately derive
from the individual liberty interests with which the Due Process
Clause is concerned. CBG underscored the fact that the Due Process
Clause, the sole source of the personal jurisdiction requirement,
nowhere mentions federalism concerns. 218 That Clause219 governs the
relationship between an individual and a sovereign, and serves to
215. Professor Lewis agrees that forum state interests should play no role in the jurisdiction
determination: 'The presence of a strong forum interest in opening its courts to a plaintiffs claim
is wholly fortuitous from the standpoint of the defendant and does not even tend to show that the
forum is fair to him. By the same token, if a forum is fair to the defendant, the absence of a forum
state interest in hearing the case should not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing his claim there."
Id. at 705-06.
216. See notes 176-80 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for legislation that would
provide for transfer and consolidation of complex litigation in a single forum). If this jurisdictional standard were adopted, choice-of-law considerations would become of primary
importance, because a neutral forum in theory would have no reason to apply its own substantive
law.
217. The Court's conception of the constitutional boundaries of personal jurisdiction is based
on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court first linked the
personal jurisdiction doctrine to notions of due process in Pennoyer's famous dictum- "Since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment... proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process of law." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). The Fourteenth
Amendment could not apply to Pennoyer,however, because it was not ratified until 1868, after the
plaintiff had obtained his judgment against nonresident defendant Neff. See also Ins. Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG), 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (stating that "[t]he
requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III but from the Due
Process Clause"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958) (proclaiming that '[w]ith the
adoption of [the Fourteenth] Amendment, any judgment purporting to bind the person of the
defendant over whom the court had not acquired in personam jurisdiction was void within the
[forum] State as well as without"). See also Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1015 (cited in note 60)
(tracing the historical development of the jurisdiction concept from its common-law origin to its
application in Supreme Court case law); Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112 (cited in note 44) (tracing
the historical development of the "due process" concept).
218. CBG, 456 U.S. at 703 n.10. See also Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1032 n.72 (cited in note
60).
219. The Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the states, provides: "No State shall . . .
deprive any person of like, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV. This Recent Development uses the term "Due Process Clause" to refer to the Fourteenth
Amendment, because the more common jurisdiction questions, as well as the Ashley situation,
concern a state's assertion of jurisdiction.
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protect individual liberty interests.2 When read literally, the Due
Process Clause has no application to interstate relations.221 Critics of
the Court's approach note that the Court's willingness to interject
sovereignty considerations into the jurisdiction analysis is not
supported by the text of the Due Process Clause itself, nor by the
policies underlying it.222

220. The personal jurisdiction requirement, according to CBG, "recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest." CBG, 456 U.S. at 702.
221. The Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hall,440 U.S. 410 (1979), rejected a claim by one state
that it was immune from suit in the courts of a sister state. Allowing the courts of one state to
exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign certainly poses a greater threat to interstate
harmony than could a court's exercise of jurisdiction over an individual nonresident defendant.
The Nevada Court concluded, however, that no constitutional provision required one state to
acknowledge the sovereign immunity of a sister state, warning that "caution should be exercised
before concluding that unstated limitations on state powers were intended by the Framers." Id.
at 425. The World.Wide Court apparently ignored this admonition when it stated that concepts of
interstate federalism implicit in the Constitution served to limit a state's authority to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
222. One scholar has noted that, although the Court has injected interstate federalism
elements into the due process inquiry, "ithas relied on neither the language, history, nor policy of
the due process clause to justify its construction. Indeed, such notions of federalism as limitations
on the reach of personal jurisdiction are found nowhere in the body of the Constitution, much less
in the terms of the due process clause." Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1114 (cited in note 44)
(footnotes omitted).
Professor Redish offers a detailed and persuasive analysis of the proper scope of due process
analysis in jurisdiction jurisprudence. Redish claims that the jurisdiction cases beginning with
Pennoyer and culminating in the purposeful availment standard set by World-Wide Volkswagen
have misconstrued the proper scope of the Due Process Clause in determining the reach of
judicial jurisdiction. Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses govern the
relationship between a sovereign and an individual and are designed to protect individual liberty.
Redish presents a strong argument that notions of federalism have been inappropriately grafted
onto the Due Process Clause by Supreme Court jurisdiction jurisprudence:
In virtually every other context, due process-in both its substantive and procedural
manifestations-has been construed as a protection of private parties from some form of
injustice. In the personal jurisdiction context, however, the Court has infused vague
concepts of interstate sovereignty into the due process clause ....

Although the Court has

assumed since the time of Pennoyer that the due process clause embodies such notions of
federalism, it has relied on neither the language, history, nor policy of the due process
clause to justify its construction.
Id. at 1113-14 (footnotes omitted). Professor Redish concludes by proposing a new jurisdiction
standard premised on analysis of inconvenience to the defendant and state interests. Id. at 113742. According to Professor Redish, any neutral forum should be permitted to exercise jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant as long as the defendant is not inconvenienced by the exercise of
jurisdiction. Id. at 1137.
Professor Redish's test is remarkably similar to Ashley. His proposal differs in only one
significant respect: he would apply a burden analysis at the outset, upholding jurisdiction as long
as no meaningful inconvenience to the individual litigant would result. Id. Only if the exercise of
jurisdiction would result in significant inconvenience to the defendant does Professor Redish
examine the forum state's interest in the litigation. Id. at 1140-41 & n.176. This ordering reflects
his belief that sovereigity concerns should play only a minimal role, if any, in the jurisdiction
analysis. Ashley, in contrast, recognizes the relevance of a sovereignty inquiry, but focuses this
inquiry on state interests rather than territorial contacts. See also Braveman, 33 Syracuse L.
Rev. at 541-43, 548 (cited in note 62); Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at 1032-33 (cited in note 60).
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For this reason, courts and scholars frequently have proposed
that federalism concerns, served through the minimum contacts
requirement, be removed from the jurisdictional inquiry entirely and
addressed through improved choice-of-law rules.223 The interstate
federalism doctrine that formed the basis for Pennoyer and the
"territorial contacts" analysis that has persisted in jurisdiction jurisprudence at most are connected remotely to due process. 224 Ashley
therefore offers the prospect of a jurisdictional standard that focuses
entirely on the liberty interests of litigants, with no regard for state
sovereignty concerns. 225
4. Judicial Economy and Efficiency
A final, and perhaps paramount, consideration weighs in favor
of the more expansive jurisdictional standard advocated by Ashley. A
broader test for personal jurisdiction will facilitate judicial economy by
ensuring that a maximum number of plaintiffs' and defendants' rights
are adjudicated in a single proceeding. 226 The Supreme Court has
cited the interest of the interstate judicial system in resolving
223. Indeed, Burger King noted that "the process of resolving potentially conflicting
'fundamental substantive social policies'... can usually be accommodated through choice-of-law
rules rather than through outright preclusion of jurisdiction in one forum." BurgerKing Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483 n.26 (1985) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). See
also Mandler, 1 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. at 64 (cited in note 4) (claiming that "[t]he Supreme Court
can best protect... state interests by formulating constitutional limitations on state choice-of-law
rather than relying on personal jurisdiction limitations"); McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 10 (cited
in note 133) (arguing that "[tihe territorial foundation of the minimum contacts approach, as
developed by the Supreme Court, not only bears little relation to the activities of people in their
everyday lives, but also operates as a barrier to an appropriate consideration of due process
protections for all the parties involved in a controversy"). Compare Drobak, 68 Iowa L. Rev. at
1046-48, 1058, 1065-66 (cited in note 60) (concluding that although interstate federalism cannot
operate as an independent restriction on judicial jurisdiction, federalism concerns are preserved
in the jurisdictional inquiry as a "by-product" of fairness or burden analyses).
224. "The traditional due process concerns-whether the defendant will suffer a deprivation
of liberty or property without fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to defend-are at best only
tangentially related to... sovereignty concerns." Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 578. Ashley points out
that this concern motivated Justice Hunt's dissent in Pennoyer. he repudiated the notion that due
process required more than adequate notice and an opportunity to defend. Id. See Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 748 (1877) (Hunt, J., dissenting).
225. See note 202 (noting the Ashley proposal that the Supreme Court eliminate even an
"interest" analysis from the jurisdiction standard, thus permitting a neutral forum to assert
jurisdiction). The importance of clear choice-of-law rules in such a scenario is apparent.
226. See Note, 94" Harv. L. Rev. at 675 (cited in note 18) (arguing that "inequitable
inconsistencies between DES decisions will be minimized if as many defendants and plaintiffs as
possible have their rights adjudicated in the same proceeding"); Abramson, 18 Hastings Const. L.
Q. at 456 (cited in note 127) (noting that "[c]ourts have expressed... concern regarding 'whether
litigating in a particular forum will allow the plaintiff to join all parties in one suit.' In multiparty
litigation, a plaintiff may be burdened substantially if forced to proceed in parallel or piecemeal
actions, especially when the plaintiff has limited litigation resources.") (citation and footnotes
omitted).
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controversies most efficiently227 as a relevant factor in assessing the
reasonableness of a forum's assertion of jurisdiction. 228 This interest is

best served by litigation in the state where the injury occurred and
where witnesses are located229 and in the court that can interpret the
applicable law most competently. 30 Perhaps most importantly,
efficient resolution of controversies is accomplished through avoidance
of piecemeal litigation: if possible, all conflicts should be resolved in a
single proceeding. Thus, a court with jurisdiction over some defendants should be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over all defendants
in order to avoid duplicative litigation.23 1
These factors point to upholding jurisdiction over the defendant
manufacturers in Ashley, because the plaintiffs were residents of New
York, a substantial portion of relevant evidence was located in New
York,23. 2 and New York courts would be most competent to interpret
the applicable law-the substantive law of New York related to compensation of DES victims. 23 3 The Ashley court was particularly
227. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. One commentator has stated that '[t]he
'efficient resolution' interest takes several forms, emphasizing (1) the preference for the forum
where the injury occurred and/or where the witnesses reside, (2) the avoidance of piecemeal
litigation, and (3) the role of choice-of-law principles." Abramson, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 461.
228. One scholar has emphasized the importance of efficiency considerations:
The collective community of states . . . possesses an interest in providing the greatest
possible economy in resolving trans-state controversies. Only in rare circumstances
should due process require multiple litigation over identical, closely related, or overlapping factual issues. Such repetitive litigation in two or more states sacrifices judicial efficiency and imposes an obvious burden on individual claimants. The collective community
of states, therefore, has an interest in precluding, to the maximum extent feasible, the
unnecessary waste of individual and state resources on repetitive litigation.
McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 24 (cited in note 133). Professor McDougal cites the class action as
an example of the judicial system's concern for efficient resolution of multiparty controversies. Id.
at 24-25. He further argues that minimum contacts should not be required to establish
jurisdiction over class action defendants, because such a requirement would severely undermine
the interests promoted by the class action device. Id.
229. Abramson, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 460 (cited in note 127).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 463 (arguing that "[i]n litigation involving numerous defendants from diverse
geographic locations, it would be onerous and cumbersome to require the plaintiff to proceed
separately against each defendant in the defendant's home forum, particularly given the strong
federal interest in allowing for efficient conduct of a complex lawsuit") (citing Delong Equip. Co. v.
Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 1988).
Indeed, Professor
McDougal claims that
a free democratic society should seek to provide a claimant with at least one forum in
which he may timely present his claim against all those who allegedly have caused.., the
claimant to suffer value deprivations. A failure to provide such a forum may subject the
claimant to conflicting decisions that completely or substantially deny him any redress,
even though at least one of a number of defendants clearly should bear responsibility for
the claimant's plight.
McDougal, 35 Vend. L. Rev. at 22 (cited in note 133) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
232. The evidence located in New York included medical records of the DES plaintiffs.
233. For the Ashley court's analysis of choice-of-law issues raised by the DES litigation, see
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 566-69.
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troubled by the fact that, were it not to exercise jurisdiction over all
defendants, the plaintiffs might find themselves barred from recovery
against those defendants in any other court. 234 Similar concerns
clearly would be present in other DES litigation, and presumably in a
great deal of non-DES mass tort litigation as well.
Efficiency concerns are particularly important in complex
litigation cases, in which the dangers of multiple actions and
inconsistent judgments are especially potent.25 An intelligible, concise
test, such as that offered by Ashley, inevitably will further due process
values, because a clear jurisdiction standard provides stability and
predictability that allow potential defendants to structure their
conduct with some minimum degree of certainty about whether and
where that conduct will render them amenable t6 suit.23 6
Finally, the interest- and fairness-centered standard adopted
by the Ashley court would not result in a significant increase in problems of interpretation and application, particularly given the uncertain history of the Supreme Court's minimum contacts and purposeful
availment standards. The Ashley test is no more unpredictable than
the contacts requirement established by International Shoe and its
progeny.237 Indeed, after Burnham, one wonders precisely how
"predictable" the current jurisdictional framework can be.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ashley takes a confident step toward establishing a coherent
formulation for judicial jurisdiction in mass tort litigation. The Ashley
court has attempted to identify the prevailing jurisdictional doctrine
most appropriate to mass tort jurisdiction analysis and has discarded
those elements that should not play a role in the jurisdiction determination. Although Ashley is willing to abandon several elements that
have been staples of jurisdiction law since International Shoe, the
court does so with an eye toward adapting jurisdiction law to the
234. Id. at 576. The court was concerned that if the plaintiffs were forced to sue the
nonresident defendants in another forum (such as California), that state's law would apply and
the plaintiffs would be barred from recovery.
235. See McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 37-40 (cited in note 133) (analyzing the difficulties of
multiparty litigation and the importance of resolution in a single proceeding).
236. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
237. See Redish, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1142 (cited in note 44): "[A]pplication of the Supreme
Court's confusing 'mininum contacts' test is likely to produce at least as many problems in
interpretation and application as [a] new test. More importantly, once we accept the theoretical
precepts about the proper concern of a due process limitation on the reach of personal jurisdiction
... it is difficult to imagine a logical alternative to [such a] new test."
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economic and social realities of modern America, particularly in the
unique context of mass tort litigation. As Justice Marshall noted in
Shaffer v. Heitner, "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient
forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures
that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.2 8 The Ashley court should be applauded for its willingness to
discard an ancient form that lacks substantial modern justification.
Julia ChristineBunting

238. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).

